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Motivation and Overview1
Agents who interact in economic markets generally are different in various aspects,
for example concerning taste, reservation price, or their action space. Additionally,
they often have imperfect information of the situation they face. In consumer mar-
kets, even if the consumers had perfect information, the large amount of it would
already lead to a vast game theoretic problem, if approached rationally. Hence, it
is worthwhile considering and analyzing heterogeneous agents with limited informa-
tion as well as boundedly rational consumers in order to find out what consequences
these assumptions have in economic modeling.
The question arises how agents approach the problem of finding the best possible
solution for them, given the behavior of the other agents, when a standard game
theoretic ansatz seems too complicated, unrealistic, or requires disproportionately
high effort. Possible, often pursued strategies include the reliance on an inductive
learning rule or a rule of thumb for the agents’ behavior in order to come to a
reasonable economic decision.
This dissertation deals with both a model in which agents with limited informa-
tion conform to a learning rule, as well as boundedly rational consumers who follow
1The first chapter of this dissertation is based upon the paper “Taking a Shower in Youth
Hostels: Risks and Delights of Heterogeneity” which was written in joint work with Damien Challet
(Matzke & Challet 2008). It found public recognition in articles of online Nature news (18. Jan
2008), PhysicsWorld (Vol. 21, No. 2, Feb 2008), FAZ (12. Feb 2008), New Scientist (issue
2643, 16 Feb 2008), Bayerischer Rundfunk (Interview 09.06.2008), forsch - Bonner Universita¨ts-
Nachrichten (Nr. 2/3, Juni 2008). The second and third chapters are based on the papers “The
Evolution of Sales with Habitual and Imitative Consumers” and “Product Pricing when Demand
Follows a Rule of Thumb”, respectively, which were written together with Benedikt Wirth (Matzke
& Wirth 2008a, Matzke & Wirth 2008b).
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simple rules of thumb. The first case is treated within a generic, illustrative model
situation, the so-called Shower Temperature Problem, in which the agents possess
either the same (homogeneous) or an individual (heterogeneous) action space. The
latter case is treated for consumer markets and additionally requires the modeling
of an appropriate, strategic pricing of firms.
In summary, the main result of the Shower Temperature Problem is that action
heterogeneity represents a robust solution for the agents with only few systematic
deviations, but at the cost of a higher risk for the individual agent than in the
homogeneous case.
Regarding the market of boundedly rational consumers, we will obtain interesting
results how psychological and experimental results can be cast into a mathematical
model with boundedly rational, habit-forming and imitative consumers; we will
analyze this consumer model and investigate its consequences. From the firms’
point of view, we will examine conditions under which firms operate profitably in
the long-term. Furthermore, we will show that the considered market is in a sense
well-behaved, since for a rising number of firms, the prices decrease, the prices of
the weakest products converge against marginal costs, and the welfare rises. We
will also prove for a monopoly that Nash equilibria are already found in the strategy
space of all time-constant price paths. Finally, advertising is shown to be an effective
method to sustain demand.
There exist many publications dealing with heterogeneity and lack of informa-
tion. Those in the area of minority games are most related to the approach in the
Shower Temperature Problem. The initial impulse for the theory of minority games
came from Arthur (1994). It is argued that inductive reasoning is more realistic
than deductive reasoning in complex and complicated decision making situations.
The agents’ decision process is characterized by bounded rationale and lack of in-
formation, and additionally it is based solely on the history of the game outcomes.
Hence, the agents learn from their experiences. Challet & Zhang (1997a) proposed
a mathematical model incorporating the agents’ features described in Arthur (1994)
and the theory of minority games was born. We will borrow some ideas from minor-
ity games concerning the agents’ learning rule and the influence of the game history
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on future actions, that is, the inductive reasoning. In the classical minority game,
heterogeneity of the agents is of considerable importance since it is worthwhile for
the agents to behave differently. The Shower Temperature Problem opens a slightly
different perspective on action heterogeneity.
Boundedly rational consumer behavior is often observed in consumer research, in
particular imitation of group behavior or habitual purchase (cf. Assael 1984, p. 371ff,
53). Indications for such a behavior can also be found in psychological experiments
such as Venkatesan (1966), Corriveau et al. (2009) or Pingle & Day (1996). Ad-
ditionally, imitative behavior constitutes a concept frequently used in evolutionary
game theory and social learning, as for instance in Schlag (1998), Ellison & Fuden-
berg (1993), and Banerjee (1992), and habit occurs in the habit formation literature
(Heaton 1993) as well as implicitly in some industrial organization models (for ex-
ample Smallwood & Conlisk (1979), which is closely related to the demand dynamic
employed in this dissertation). Habit may also be interpreted as a special case of
learning, since agents learn from past experience (Sobel 2000, p. 257) and positive
experience with a good may cause habitual purchase behavior.
From the mathematical point of view, the consumer market model is stated in
form of a population game as defined in Sandholm (2005) and Sandholm (2006),
who makes use of the fact that for a large population size, the stochastic process
generated by an evolutionary process can be approximated by solutions to ordinary
differential equations (Bena¨ım & Weibull 2003).
The firms, analyzed in this dissertation, aim at maximizing their profits given
the demand side and the pricing strategies of the competitors. In order to accom-
plish this, we employ a differential game as introduced by Isaacs (1954), that is, a
time-continuous game where the state variables (here the consumer subpopulation
sizes) follow first-order ordinary differential equations. More specifically, the chosen
product prices (control variables) determine the rate of change in consumer subpop-
ulation sizes (state variables), where consumers are grouped into subpopulations
according to the product they own.
The model will be able to generate typical patterns observed in consumer markets
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such as product life cycles (de Kluyver 1977, Brockhoff 1967, Polli & Cook 1969).
The outline of the dissertation is as follows. Chapter 1 focuses on learning and
the advantages of action heterogeneity: Tuning one’s shower in some hotels may
turn into a challenging coordination game with imperfect information. The temper-
ature sensitivity increases with the number of agents, making the problem possibly
unlearnable. Because there is in practice a finite number of possible tap positions,
identical agents are unlikely to reach even approximately their favorite water tem-
perature. Heterogeneity allows some agents to reach much better temperatures, at
the cost of higher risk.
The Shower Temperature Problem is an easily accessible example for a wide range
of other situations in economics which can be modeled by similar means. Another
application is, for instance, the problem of how many employees each firm should
optimally employ, depending on how many projects this firm has. One can also
examine the question of how many products each firm should optimally produce,
depending on the fluctuating demand.
In chapter 2 we analyze demand in markets where consumers follow simple behav-
ioral decision rules based on imitation and habit as suggested in consumer research,
social learning, and related fields. Demand can be viewed as the outcome of a pop-
ulation game whose revision protocol is determined by the consumers’ behavioral
rules. The evolution of sales is then analyzed in order to explore the demand side
and first implications for a strategic supply side, as well as conditions under which a
product survives on the market. For the two goods case, structural stability of the
system can be proven.
In chapter 3 we analyze the strategic behavior of firms when demand is deter-
mined by the rule of thumb behavior from the previous chapter. We investigate
monopoly and competition between firms, described via an open-loop differential
game which in this setting is equivalent to but analytically more convenient than
a closed-loop system. We derive a Nash equilibrium and examine the influence of
advertising. We show for the monopoly case that a reduction of the space of all
price paths in time to the space of time-constant prices is sensible since the latter in
4
general contains Nash equilibria. We prove that the equilibrium price of the weakest
active firm tends to marginal cost as the number of (non-identical) firms grows. Our
model is consistent with observed market behavior such as product life cycles.
5
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Chapter 1
Taking a Shower in Youth Hostels:
Risks and Delights of
Heterogeneity
1.1 Introduction
Taking a shower can turn into a painful tuning and retuning game when many
people take a shower at the same time if the flux of hot water is insufficient. In
this fascinating game, it is in the interest of everybody not only to reach an agree-
able equilibrium temperature but also to avoid large fluctuations. These two goals
are difficult to achieve because one inevitably not only has incomplete information
about the behavior and personal preferences of the other bathers, but also about
the nonlinear intricacies of the plumbing system.
The central issue of this paper is to find the conditions under which the agents
are satisfied, which depends on the learning procedure and on its parameters.
The need to depart from rational representative agents was forcefully voiced
among others by Kirman (2006) and Brian Arthur, for instance in his El Farol bar
problem (Arthur 1994), subsequently simplified as minority game (Challet & Zhang
1997b, Challet et al. 2005), from which we shall borrow some ideas concerning the
learning mechanism. In these models, the agents try to behave maximally differently
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from each other, hence the need for heterogeneous agents.
The Shower Temperature Problem is different in that the perfect equilibrium is
obtained when all the agents behave exactly in the same optimal, unique way. A
priori, it is a perfect example of a case where the representative agent approach fully
applies. As we shall see, however, because in practice there is only a finite number of
tap tuning settings, it may pay off to be heterogeneous with respect to the strategy
sets. The reason lies in the fact that in a discrete world the optimal setting most
probably is not part of the choice set.
Therefore, the problem we propose in this paper is another example of a situ-
ation where heterogeneity is tempting because potentially beneficial. The intrinsic
and strong non-linearity of the temperature response function prevents the use of
the mathematical machinery for heterogeneous systems that successfully solved the
minority game (Challet et al. 2005, Coolen 2005), the El Farol bar problem (Challet
et al. 2004) and the Clubbing problem (De Sanctis & Galla 2006).
1.2 The Shower Temperature Problem
One of the problems of poor plumbing systems is the interaction between the water
temperatures of all the people taking a shower simultaneously. If one person changes
her shower setting, she influences the temperature of all the other bathers. However,
this only happens when a higher hot water flux is required than the plumbing system
can provide. In that case, cascading shower tuning and retuning may follow. A key
issue is how people can learn from past temperature fluctuations how to tune their
own shower so as to obtain an average agreeable temperature Tˆ , and also to avoid
large temperature fluctuations.
Some rudimentary shower systems allow only for one degree of freedom, the
desired fraction of hot water in one’s shower water, denoted by φ ∈ [0, 1]. Assuming
that H and C = H denote the maximal fluxes of hot and cold water available to a
shower, the obtained temperature is equal to
T =
φHTH + CTC(1− φ)
φH + C(1− φ) , (1.1)
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where TH and TC denote the constant temperatures of hot and cold water.
In the following, we shall consider the special case were TC = 0 and TH = 1,
which amounts to expressing T in TH units, i. e. to rescale T by TH , which leads to
T = φ.
The situation may become more complex, however, if many people take a shower
at the same time. Indeed, it sometimes happens that altogether the N bathers ask
for a larger hot water flux than the plumbing system can provide, a feature more
likely found in old-style youth hostels than in more upmarket hotels. Assume that
the total available hot water flux for all bathers together is H while the cold water
flux available at each single shower is C = H . We denote by Φ =
∑N
i=1 φi the total
fraction of desired hot water. If Φ > 1, each agent will only receive the hot water
amount (φi/Φ)H instead of φiH , and therefore the total flux of hot water she obtains
is smaller than expected. The amount of cold water is still (1− φi)C, according to
the agent’s choice, since cold water is assumed to be unrestricted. Finally, agent i
obtains
Ti =
φi
φi +Ψ(1− φi) , (1.2)
where Ψ = max(1,Φ). Clearly, Ti(φi = 0) = 0 and Ti(φi = 1) = 1. When Φ ≤ 1,
this equation reduces to the no-interaction case Ti = φi. Therefore, provided that
Φ > 1, the agents interact through the temperature they each obtain, that is, via Φ.
Assuming no inter-agent communication, the global quantity Φ is the only means of
interaction. Therefore, this model is of mean-field nature. Henceforth, we consider
the more involved case of interaction, i. e. Φ > 1.
1.3 Tuning one’s shower
1.3.1 Equilibrium and sensitivity: the homogeneous case
Before setting up the full adaptive agent model, we shall discuss the homogeneous
case where φi = φ.
Assuming that all the agents have the same favorite temperature (Tˆi = Tˆ ≤ 1),
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Figure 1.1: Individual temperature as a function of φ in the homogeneous case for
increasing N (from top to bottom).
they do not interact if N ≤ 1/φ, in which case φ = Tˆ and hence N ≤ 1/Tˆ . In the
reverse case, if N > 1/Tˆ (or equivalently N > 1/φ) the equilibrium in which all
agents obtain their favorite temperature Tˆ can be deduced from equation (1.2) with
Ψ = Nφ, i. e.
Tˆ =
φ
φ+Nφ(1− φ)
which is equivalent to
φ = φeq = 1− 1
N
(
1
Tˆ
− 1
)
. (1.3)
Hence, there is always a φ that satisfies everybody (for instance, setting Tˆ = 1/2
leads to φeq = 1− 1/N). In equilibrium each agent actually gets φeqH/(N · φeq) =
C/N hot water instead of φeqH and thus a total water flux of C/N + (1− φeq)C =
C/(NTˆ ). Hence, indeed the desired temperature Tˆ is reached for every agent, but
the total water flux per agent is quite small for large N .
The sensitivity of T to φ, defined as χ = dT
dφ
= N
[1+N(1−φ)]2
is an increasing func-
tion of φ and maximal at φ = 1 (a similar result also holds for Ti =
φi
φi+Φ(1−φi)
).
The problem is that χ(φeq) = NTˆ
2 ∝ N ; therefore, as N increases, tuning φ around
φeq becomes more and more difficult, suggesting already that the agents might ex-
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perience difficulties to learn how to tune their shower. Figure 1.1 illustrates this
phenomenon: As N increases, the region in which most of the variation of T occurs
shrinks substantially.
This problem is made worse by the fact that, in practice, there is only a finite
number S of possible values for φ that can be effectively used by the agents, mostly
because of internal tap static friction—the larger the friction, the smaller the number
of different achievable values for φ. Assuming that the resolution in φ is δφ, or
equivalently that S = 1/(δφ) values of φ are usable, it becomes impossible to tune
one’s shower if |T (φeq ± δφ)− Tˆ | ≃ χ(φeq)δφ is larger than some acceptable value.
As χ ∝ N around φeq, S ∝ N is needed; as a consequence, the ideal temperature is
not learnable beyond a number of agents, which is for a large part pre-determined
by the plumbing system.
1.3.2 Learning
The question is how to reach φeq. In this model, it is hoped that the agents have a
common interest to avoid large fluctuations of Ti around their favorite temperature
Tˆi: The Shower Temperature Problem is a repeated coordination game (cf. Crawford
& Haller (1990) and Bhaskar (2000)) with many agents and limited information.
The dynamics of the agents are fully determined by their possible tap settings,
hereafter called strategies, and by the trust they have in them. Before the game
begins, each agent i is equipped with S possible strategies φi,s ∈ [0, 1], s = 1, ..., S,
which are kept constant during the game (how to choose the strategy φ is discussed
in the next section). The typical resolution in φ is 1/S; for the same reason, the
typical maximal φi over all the agents is of order 1 − 1/S. This paper follows the
road of inductive behavior advocated by Brian Arthur: To each possible choice φi,s
agent i attributes a score Ui,s(t) (where t denotes the time step of the game), which
describes its cumulated payoff at time t. The agents choose their φi,s probabilis-
tically according to a logit model P (φi(t) = φi,s) = exp(ΓUi,s(t))/Z, where Z is a
normalization factor and Γ is the rate of reaction to a relative change of Ui,s.
If one were to follow blindly El Farol bar problem and minority game literature,
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one would write
Ui,s(t+ 1) = Ui,s(t) + φi,s
[
Tˆi − Ti(t)
]
.
When S > 2, such payoffs are not suitable any more; a payoff allowing for a gradual
increase of φi,s is necessary. Absolute value-based payoffs are fit for this purpose,
mathematically,
Ui,s(t+ 1) = Ui,s(t)−
∣∣∣Tˆi − Ti(t)∣∣∣ .
This payoff however does not depend on φi,s. As a consequence, all the strategies
would have the same payoff. Therefore, one has to give more information to the
agents. An agent that has perfect information about the plumbing system, the tem-
peratures and fluxes of hot and cold water—for instance the plumber that built the
whole installation—may know precisely which temperature she would have obtained,
had she played φi,s′ instead of her chosen action φi,si(t). Such people are probably
not very frequent amongst the general population, however. This is why we shall
consider an in-between case, where the agents’ estimation of Ti,s(t) is a linear inter-
polation between the temperature of the strategy currently in use, i. e. Ti(t) = Ti,si(t)
and its correct virtual value. The payoff is therefore
Ui,s(t+ 1) = Ui,s(t)(1− λ)− λ
∣∣∣Tˆi − (1− η)Ti(t)− ηTi,s(t)∣∣∣ , (1.4)
where η ∈ [0, 1] encodes the ability of the agents to infer the influence of φi,s on
the real temperature and 0 ≤ λ < 1 introduces an exponential decay of cumulated
payoffs, with typical score memory length ∝ 1/λ. The parameter η is to some
extent related to the difference between naive and sophisticated agents as defined
by (Easley & Rustichini 1999). The first kind of agents believe that they are faced
with an external process, i. e. that they do not contribute to Φ, whereas sophisticated
agents are able to compute Φ−i = Φ−φi. In this model, perfect sophisticated agents
have η = 1.
1.4 Results
It is natural to measure two collective quantities, the average temperature T ob-
tained by the agents and its average distance from ideal temperature averaged over
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all the agents, denoted by ∆T = T − Tˆ ; this characterizes the average tempera-
ture obtained by the agents, or how far the agents are collectively from their goal.
The individual dissatisfaction is the distance from the ideal temperature for a given
agent. One therefore measures it with |δT | = 1
N
∑N
i=1 |Ti − Tˆi|; it is a measure of
the dispersion (and therefore positively correlated with the agents’ risk).
Concerning the numerical simulations, all the quantities reported here are mea-
sured in the stationary state over 10, 000 time steps for Tˆ = 0.5, η = 1, λ = 0.001
and if not stated differently N = 20, after an equilibration time of 30/(λΓ). The
stationary state does not depend much on λ. On the other hand, the performance
of the population is of course improved as η increases and saturates for η > 0.5. The
role of Γ is discussed below.
1.4.1 Homogeneous population
Since the equilibrium is reached when all the agents tune their shower in exactly the
same way, trying first homogeneous agents (or equivalently a representative agent)
makes sense a priori. We shall therefore set φi,s = φs =
s
S+1
, s = 1, ..., S so that the
agents avoid using only hot or cold water.
Agents with homogeneous strategies have a peculiar way of converging to their
ideal temperature as S increases. Figure 1.2 displays the oscillations of the reached
temperature with decreasing amplitude as a function of S. The asymmetric upward
and downward slopes are due to the asymmetry of T around φeq, as seen in Fig-
ure 1.1. Theoretically, this can easily be explained by assuming that all the agents
select the same s that gives T as close as possible to Tˆ . Solving φi,s =
s
S+1
= φeq for
s, we obtain sˆ = [1−1/N(1/Tˆ−1)](S+1). The agents therefore choose [sˆ] or [sˆ]+1,
where [x] is the integer part of x (one may need to enforce [sˆ] < S when S < N).
Either T ([sˆ]) or T ([sˆ]+1) is closest to Tˆ , therefore the actually optimal temperature
Tth (whichever T ([sˆ]) or T ([sˆ] + 1)) oscillates around Tˆ , as seen in Figure 1.2. The
period of the oscillations is N , and their amplitude decreases as 1/S. As expected, a
very large value of Γ replicates closely the dented nature of the value of Tth, in which
case all the agents take the same choice even close to the peak of Tth. Generally,
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Figure 1.2: Average temperature T reached by homogeneous agents as a function
of S for various Γ. Inset: T vs. (S + 1)/N , showing the scaling property of T , with
N = 10, 20, 40 (asterisks, triangles, crosses).
smaller Γ (at least to a certain degree) leads to better average temperatures as it
allows to play mixed strategies and thus combine two temperatures so as to achieve
a collective average result closer to Tˆ . From that point of view, Γ = 50 is a better
choice than Γ = 1000. Hence, there exists an optimal global value of Γ, leading to
a mixed-strategy equilibrium. This is because taking stochastic decisions is a way
to overcome the rigid structure imposed on the strategy space, whose inadequacy
is reinforced by the strong non-linearity of T (φ). A too small Γ is detrimental as it
allows for using φ further away from φeq. Because of the shape of T (φ), those with
smaller φ are more likely to be selected. To find the optimal Γ, we may average
|∆T | over S in numerical simulations, for instance with I = ∑5NS=N |∆T |/(4N).1
The inset of Figure 1.3 reports that the minimum of I is at Γ ≃ 42 for the chosen
parameters, which shows the existence of an optimal learning rate.
The individual dissatisfaction |δT | unsurprisingly mirrors |∆T | since all the play-
1Simulations show that the average temperature is in fact a function of (S+1)/N (cf. Figure 1.2)
(instead of a function of S and N), i. e. Figure 1.3 would look the same if S was fixed and N varied.
Hence we may take the average over S instead of over N .
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Figure 1.3: Average temperature T reached by homogeneous agents as a function
of S for Γ = 100. Squares: theory, circles: numerical simulations. Inset: average
deviation I from Tˆ versus Γ (same parameters); the dotted lines are for eye guidance
only.
ers are identical. Both quantities are the same for large Γ as everybody plays the
same fixed strategy. The amplitude of |δT | also decreases as 1/S (see Figure 1.5,
squares). However, the larger Γ, the smaller |δT |, as each agent manages to get
closer to the optimal choice.
It is easy to obtain analytical insights by solving the stationary state equations
for Ui,s. For the sake of simplicity, assuming that η = 1 and that only the two
strategies around φeq, i. e. [sˆ] and [sˆ]+1, denoted by − and + respectively, are used,
one obtains the set of equations (independent from λ and i)
Ui,± = U± = −|T± − Tˆ | (1.5)
where
Ti,± = T± =
1
1 + N+φ++N−φ−
φ±
(1− φ±)
(1.6)
with N± = N · P (s = ±), where P (s = +) = exp(ΓUi,+)exp(ΓUi,+)+exp(ΓUi,−) and P (s = −) =
1−P (s = +) is a logit model for the two-strategy case S = 2. Figure 1.3 shows the
good agreement between numerical simulations and this simple theory, especially in
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Figure 1.4: Absolute temperature deviation |∆T | reached by homogeneous (squares)
and heterogeneous (circles) agents as a function of S for Γ = 100. Average over 500
samples for heterogeneous agents.
the convex part of the oscillations, as long as Γ is large enough (about 50) to prevent
the use of more than 2 strategies.
Being faced with oscillations is problematic since the agents do not know N a
priori and because N may vary with time. In addition, since all the agents select the
same φ for large Γ, not a single agent is ever likely to reach a temperature close to
Tˆ . However, the individual satisfaction is maximal in the limit Γ→∞ (see above)
since |δT | gets minimal there.
1.4.2 Heterogeneous population
There are many ways for agents to be heterogeneous. One could imagine to vary S,
Γ, η, λ or Tˆ amongst the agents. Here we focus on strategy heterogeneity, i. e. the
agents face showers with different tap settings: The strategy space of agent i is
no longer 1
S+1
, . . . , S
S+1
, but now each agent has an individual strategy space where
each strategy φi,s, s = 1, . . . , S, is assigned a random number from the uniform
distribution on [0, 1] before the simulation.
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Figure 1.5: Individual dissatisfaction |δT | reached by homogeneous (squares) and
heterogeneous agents (circles) as a function of S for Γ = 1000. Average over 500
samples for heterogeneous agents. Dashed line: theoretical predictions.
Thus, each heterogeneous agent has a different strategy set she can choose from.
This heterogeneity may, for instance, emerge from the internal tap friction and how
each agent deals with it (e. g. big pushes versus tapping on the tap).
Intuitively, the effect of heterogeneity is to break the structural rigidity of the
strategy set of a representative agent. Figure 1.4 reports that |∆T | does not os-
cillate, and converges to zero faster than S−1. Homogeneous agents might achieve
a better average temperature depending on N and S, but on the whole perform
collectively worse. In addition, heterogeneous agents expect to have a smaller than
ideal temperature, but on average predictably smaller, with no strong dependence
on S. Thus, the expectation over the temperature of the agents is much improved
by heterogeneity.
However, looking at the average absolute individual deviation from Tˆ reveals that
the uncertainty brought by heterogeneity is considerably worse on average. Plotting
|δT | for both types of agents shows that |δT | is always smaller for homogeneous
agents (Figure 1.5). This means that being heterogeneous is more risky. Which
agent (or equivalently, shower) performs better depends not only on N , but also on
the tuning settings of all the agents.
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Figure 1.6: Fraction of the simulations for which a single heterogeneous agent is
worse off than the other N − 1 homogeneous agents; Γ = 1000 (crosses) and Γ = 30
(circles). Average over 2000 samples.
1.5 Discussion and conclusions
Heterogeneity may be tempting as it suppresses the systematic abrupt oscillations
experienced by homogeneous populations and is collectively better on average. How-
ever, it seems that heterogeneous showers are potentially more risky. However, it
is human nature to take a risk in the hope to be better off, even if the probability
is small, think of the lottery, for instance. Hence, the information how good the
best agent (or the few best ones) feels is more relevant than how poor the worst
agent feels. At least some agents will try, and some of them will succeed, hence
sticking to being heterogeneous. Thus, the fact that there are some chances that
by being different one can improve the temperature means that heterogeneity will
appear because of temptation.
In other words, the agents must consider the trade-off between the temptation
of an expected better temperature and a potentially larger deviation.
The situation discussed above is only global. Does it pay off to be heterogeneous
for a single agent? An answer comes from a system consisting of N−1 homogeneous
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agents as defined above and a single random one with random φi,s. The fraction
f of the simulations in which the homogeneous showers have a smaller |Ti − Tˆi| is
reported in Figure 1.6; this quantity indicates that the majority of heterogeneous
agents are not worse off for about a quarter of the values of S. This finding is not in
contradiction with the fact that the average personal dissatisfaction of heterogeneous
agents is always larger than that of homogeneous agents: |δT | is much influenced by
large deviations contributed by a minority of agents because of large temperature
sensitivity to small deviations in φ.
The results of the Shower Temperature Problem also allow some first implications
for other economic situations which can be modeled by similar means. For instance,
consider the problem of how many employees each firm should optimally employ,
depending on how many orders this firm has. Just as the hot water supply was the
restricting factor in the Shower Temperature Problem, this role is now played by
the overall order situation, i. e. the cumulative number of all orders available on the
market. The profit of each firm now depends on the received orders (corresponding
to the fraction of hot water received) and the number of employees who draw a
salary. In turn, the maximum number of orders that can be processed and thus
accepted depends on the number of employees. Transferring the result of the Shower
Temperature Problem suggests that it might be tempting for a firm to be different
in the sense of employment strategies. Such a heterogeneity can for instance result
from different production technologies or different corporate structures.
One can also examine the question of how many (perishable or other) products
each firm should optimally produce, depending on the fluctuating demand.
As a final note, minimizing |∆T | is equivalent to solving a number partitioning
problem (Garey & Johnson 1979) in which one splits a set of N numbers ai > 0
into two subsets so that the sums of the numbers in the subsets are as close as
possible, which amounts to minimizing C = |∑i siai| where si = ±1; it is an NP-
complete problem; in other words, the only way to find the absolute minimum of C
is to sample all the 2N configurations. Let us consider an even simpler version of
the Shower Temperature Problem that makes more explicit its NP-complete nature.
Each agent i is given ai and plays φeq + siai, si = ±1. Neglecting the self-impact
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on the resulting temperature and the non-linearity of the temperature response,
the analogy between the Shower Temperature Problem and the number partitioning
problem is straightforward. Methods borrowed from statistical mechanics show that
the average optimal C scales as 2−N , which requires to enumerate the 2N possible
configurations (Mertens 1998). This is much better than what the agents achieve;
the reason for this discrepancy is that the agents do not reach a stationary state
in O(expN) time steps, hence, they cannot sample all the possible configurations.
Another reason is that the globally optimal solution may require some agents to use
a strategy that would yield a worse temperature than their optimal choice.
In conclusion, the Shower Temperature Problem shows the subtle trade-offs be-
tween a homogeneous population with equally spaced actions and a fully random
one. In a system where the agents’ action space is not likely to include the opti-
mal equilibrium choice, heterogeneity is a way to solve this kind of problem more
robustly and with less systematic deviation, at the expense of a higher risk for
individual agents.
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Chapter 2
The Evolution of Sales in a
Market with Habit-Forming and
Imitative Consumers
2.1 Introduction
Optimal economic choices are often very hard to make for consumers. Especially
if a product is new on the market, its quality can only be guessed. Consider, for
example, an innovative and new liquid crystal display (LCD) TV shortly after its
product introduction. A potential consumer does not know the true product quality
(cf. Smallwood & Conlisk 1979, p. 2), though she can have some (not necessarily
true) idea about it. In such a situation, as supported by studies in social psychology
and consumer research (e.g. Assael 1984, Venkatesan 1966), consumers often base
their product choices on imitation of others who already own the product.
Such imitative behavior will form one of the two building blocks of the model
proposed here, the second is habitual behavior, which we will motivate shortly. We
shall try to construct a formal model incorporating just these two basic behavioral
rules, which have been suggested by psychological and experimental studies. The
model will be phrased within the framework of population games and will allow
to analyze the demand side and to deduce market implications such as feasibility,
i. e. “survival” conditions for successfully introducing a new product in a single or
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multi-goods market.
Typically, in a consumer–seller relationship the degrees of freedom (e. g. price,
quality, output) are determined by the supply side. On the consumer side, any
influencing parameter (such as personal preference or reservation price) is fixed,
i. e. exogenous in a market model. Hence, the consumer can be assumed to be—
as is common practice for instance in Cournot’s standard model—purely reacting,
while the firm is acting, determining the degrees of freedom. It therefore makes
sense to model the demand and supply side separately: Only after the demand side
has been described (e. g. the demand function in the Cournot setting), a strategic
behavior of determining the degrees of freedom can be devised for the firms. This is
exactly the approach we follow, and in this chapter we deal with the demand side.
Due to their reactive role, consumers naturally do not compete actively with each
other or with firms. Hence, we have to refrain from conventional game theoretic
modeling such as the Bayesian ansatz, and we employ a population game instead,
which offers an adequate approach in this context.
This chapter aims at providing an insight into the market dynamics generated
by consumer behavior. The modeling approach is related to Smallwood & Conlisk
(1979) as well as von Thadden (1992) in that the consumers are unable or not willing
to act strategically and thus act adaptively. We extend these authors’ approaches by
examining a time-continuous model, which complicates the mathematical analysis
a little but in fact may be seen as just the next logical step after time-discrete
modeling and also resolves the problem of choosing an appropriate time period
(Dockner et al. 2001). Even more so, the time-continuous setting gives rise to novel
interesting issues such as conditions under which demand is ensured for firms over
time. A comparable analysis is impossible in time-discrete models. Furthermore, as
opposed to von Thadden (1992) we allow for a multi-goods case, and in contrast to
Smallwood & Conlisk (1979) we introduce the possibility of not buying any good.
Most importantly, we elaborate explicitly the factors habit and imitation, which
only implicitly occur in Smallwood & Conlisk (1979). Hence, despite some analogies
between our model and Smallwood & Conlisk (1979) or von Thadden (1992) our
approach is substantially different.
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We believe that our modeling approach for the demand side captures the true
mechanisms and is therefore worthwhile elaborating on. It contains a natural mathe-
matical description of psychology-based consumer behavior and more generally pro-
vides a route to incorporate psychological insights into economic modeling. Bound-
edly rational consumer behavior and continuity in time are inherent in the model
structure, and both allow insight into novel issues. For instance, only time-continuity
will enable time-continuous price paths (which will be dealt with in the next chap-
ter). Furthermore, the analysis opens a different perspective on standard results in
industrial organization and offers new explanations. It will be shown that the mar-
ket under bounded rationality performs well in the sense that e. g. competition gets
harder the more competing products enter the market. The model also explains
e. g. the long-lasting survival of a bad quality product among some high quality
products.
The next paragraphs will include a brief review of the most related modeling
work as well as of the wider range of literature that either employs a concept of
imitation or habit or yields experimental and psychological support for both.
2.1.1 Further motivation and related literature
Imitation can take place either in an implicit or explicit manner. For instance, when
a person encounters someone owning the LCD TV, the familiarity with this product
increases, implicitly raising the probability to buy it. On the other hand, explicit or
deliberate imitation may occur if a consumer understands the product’s popularity
as a hint to its past performance (cf. Ellison & Fudenberg 1993).
Imitation represents a well-known concept in areas such as evolutionary game
theory or social learning. For example, Schlag (1998) shows that a proportional
imitation rule is better than any other (well-performing or so-called improving)
behavioral rule in a multi-armed bandit environment. Ellison & Fudenberg (1993)
employ imitation through the concept of popularity weighting. For a high degree of
popularity weighting the agents choose the most popular choice, independent of its
payoff.
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An extreme result of such imitative behavior is herding. In this context,
Bikhchandani et al. (1992) explain how social conventions, norms, fashion or new
behavior can arise through informational cascades. Banerjee (1992) shows that im-
itative behavior yields socially inefficient equilibria: Herding can emerge since the
agents rather imitate others than following the information contained in their own
signal. Another approach to modeling conventions, where the own choice depends
also on past actions of others, is due to Young (1993). In his model n agents, drawn
randomly from a population, play an n-person game. They act as in fictitious play,
except that their information about the predecessors is incomplete and that the
agents are not free from errors.
Word-of-mouth learning is another field closely related to imitation and the herd-
ing literature and is said to be an important mechanism for consumers to choose
a product brand. Banerjee & Fudenberg (2004), for example, examine rational
word-of-mouth learning. They search for aspects that affect the characteristics of
word-of-mouth learning in the long run by investigating several sampling rules for
imitation. Ellison & Fudenberg (1995) represents a nice example where boundedly
rational word-of-mouth learning from a few other agents may lead to socially effi-
cient results. Similar forerunners of word-of-mouth learning are for instance Kirman
(1993), where a vivid example of herding (ants eating only from one of two exactly
identical food sources) is explained within a recruiting model, and the seminal work
of Smallwood & Conlisk (1979). In order to identify market (share) equilibria, they
investigate a model in which consumers respond to breakdowns of their products. As
in our model, they consider consumers who are uncertain about the product quality.
Their consumers buy a new product each period—either of the same brand as before
or of another one, depending on whether a breakdown happened. After breakdown,
the consumer makes a decision taking the population shares into account, i. e. how
many agents bought each brand in the last period. The analysis is then divided into
that of weakly dissatisfied and strongly dissatisfied consumers, who will not buy
the product again. Furthermore, Smallwood & Conlisk (1979) explore the equilibria
for different values of a parameter representing the consumers’ degree of confidence
in the significance of brand popularity. Only the best quality brands are used in
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equilibrium (if the model only incorporates weak, but not strong dissatisfaction) or
additionally some non-best (if the model only incorporates strong, but not weak
dissatisfaction) if there are moderate consumers’ beliefs about brand popularity. In
a second step, Smallwood and Conlisk consider the supply side of the market and
assume that the firms set their products’ breakdown probabilities each period in
order to maximize their profit. Due to the high mathematical complexity, they
only obtain approximate firm strategies. For the demand side, we use an approach
quite similar to Smallwood’s and Conlisk’s paper, extending and refining some ideas,
for example, including a weighting of imitation according to (anticipated) product
quality as well as introducing a habit mechanism.
Experiments in consumer research have revealed further important mechanisms
of decision making besides imitation. In particular, consumers obviously also take
their own experience and satisfaction into account, resulting in a habitual behavior
(Assael 1984). Let us return to the TV example: A consumer who owned an LCD
TV for a while and is satisfied with it rather sticks to LCD TVs instead of following
the majority of other agents buying a plasma TV. Consequently, we introduce habit
as a second mechanism.
An indication of habitual purchases was found in several studies, summarized in
Assael (1984, p. 53). Implicitly, the amount of habit induced by a product is also
modeled in Smallwood & Conlisk (1979) via its breakdown probability or so-called
“dissatisfaction probability”. The consumers buy the same brand—hence follow
their habit—until they encounter a problem. Expressed in terms of our model, if
the consumers’ habit is disturbed, the consumers imitate the buying decision of
other consumers. A habit-related aspect has also already been advanced in the
early papers of bounded rationality (for instance Simon 1955), where satisficing as
opposed to optimizing is motivated. Satisficing describes the consumer practice to
already accept the first satisfying choice instead of extensively searching for the
optimal choice. Similarly, in our model we will assume that consumers who own a
satisfying good will continue to buy it.
Generally, our approach can be classified as belonging to the bounded rationality
field as it is surveyed in at least three excellent reviews, Ellison (2006), Sobel (2000),
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and Conlisk (1996), with focuses on industrial organization, learning, and general
motivations, respectively. There seems to exist quite some work taking a basically
similar perspective as our approach. Early precursors of bounded rationality in in-
dustrial organization focus on firms’ rather than consumers’ bounded rationality, for
instance Rothschild (1947) and Cyert & March (1956). Heiner (1983) hypothesizes
that predictable behavior in economics results mostly from rules of thumb and not
from optimizing agents, since maximizing agents would lead to irregularities on the
market. More recently, von Thadden (1992) introduced a model in which the firms
act strategically, whereas the consumers do not.
In order to describe markets, we will define a game with demand and supply side,
of which the demand is the content of this chapter. A continuous time consumer
model based on behavioral rules which are reasonable according to psychologic and
experimental studies (Assael 1984, Venkatesan 1966) is used. The model is stated in
form of a population game as defined in Sandholm (2005) and Sandholm (2006), who
makes use of the fact that for a large population size, the stochastic process generated
by the evolutionary process can be approximated by solutions to ordinary differential
equations (Bena¨ım & Weibull 2003). The supply side, which will be the topic of the
next chapter, describes the strategic behavior of firms, which base their decisions
on the results of the bounded rational consumer model. Altogether, it will be seen
that two simple rule of thumb ingredients, imitation and habit, are sufficient to
generate typical patterns observed in consumer markets, such as product life cycles
(as described in de Kluyver 1977, Brockhoff 1967, Polli & Cook 1969). Concerning
the methodology, we employ a new approach to describe interacting consumers in
continuous time as well as a new method to describe supply and demand side of a
market.
Although a complete market description has to take into account supply and
demand side, the model presented in this chapter stands on its own. It is, for ex-
ample, applicable in cases where the supply side is (temporarily) almost inactive,
as, more specifically, in marginal cost pricing (Bertrand, perfect competition), sup-
ply sides with strong inertia, sticky pricing, regularity constraints, or markets with
expired patents and low entry costs which can be approximated by perfect compe-
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tition (e. g. generics in Africa). Furthermore, some implications on product survival
on the market can already be obtained, if prices and production costs are implicitly
encoded in the model parameters.
The outline of the chapter is as follows. We begin section 2.2 with the intro-
duction of the used methodology. The general methodology is then applied to a
market where demand follows a simple rule of thumb. Subsequently, we deduce the
important sales equation, motivate an appropriate revision protocol (similar to a
transition probability), and find the corresponding mean dynamic which determines
the demand evolution dependent on two parameters per product, a convincement
factor and a habit coefficient. In section 2.3 the demand evolution is analyzed for
varying numbers of different products (or brands), where the focus lies on product
feasibility. Finally, in sections 2.4 and 2.5 we discuss further model implications (in
particular for the supply side) and conclude.
2.2 Model and microfoundation of sales
This section proposes a mathematical model for the evolution of sales based on
a microfoundation. A microfoundation describes the economic dynamics on the
lowest level, i. e. on the level of the decisions by single agents. Here, the agents
behave boundedly rationally and myopically change their activities. On that basis,
interaction of a large number of agents can be described by a so-called modified
population game. The mean over all agents then provides the governing differential
equations to describe the overall, global system behavior.
After briefly introducing the methodology of a microfoundation following Sand-
holm (2005) and (2006), it is applied to a goods market, yielding a first simple result
about the relation between the evolution of product distribution and sales. Finally,
we suggest an exemplary model of consumer behavior and derive the resulting sales
evolution.
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2.2.1 Methodology
A typical normal form game consists of a population of agents, their actions, and
the payoff function, which rewards or penalizes the agents’ actions depending on the
other players’ behavior. Since the agents are usually assumed to be rational, their
behavior directly follows from maximizing payoff. However, in the case of boundedly
rational agents the payoff function is insufficient to determine their actions; a revision
protocol, for example, similar to Sandholm (2006), seems more adequate to describe
the agents’ behavior.
Definition 2.2.1 (Revision protocol). A revision protocol ρ is a map
ρ : X × R → R(n+1)×(n+1)+ , (2.1)
where X = {x = (x0, . . . , xn) ∈ [0, 1]n+1 |
∑n
i=0 xi = 1} is called the state space. The
scalar ρij(x, t) is called the conditional switch rate from activity i to activity j at
time t and state x. The sum
Ri =
n∑
j=0
ρij(x, t) (2.2)
is called the alarm clock rate of subpopulation i and the scalar pij =
ρij
Ri
the switching
probability.
Before motivating this definition, we use the revision protocol to specify the
model framework.
Definition 2.2.2 (Modified population game). A modified population game is
defined by the triple G = (N,A, ρ), where N is the agent population size, A =
{0, . . . , n} is the activity set, and ρ ∈ R(n+1)×(n+1)+ is a revision protocol.
The motivation is as follows: In a modified population game a situation with
N agents is considered, each of whom plays precisely one activity i ∈ A at a time.
We use the term “activity” as opposed to the game theoretic term “action” in order
to emphasize the continuity of the activity in time, whereas actions take place at
discrete times (e. g. in repeated games). The subpopulation of those agents playing
activity i amounts to the time-varying fraction xi of the total population so that the
set of all possible states is given by X = {x ∈ [0, 1]n+1|∑ni=0 xi = 1}. Each agent
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playing activity i is equipped with an independent Poisson alarm clock of rate Ri,
i. e. an alarm clock which rings after an exponentially distributed time with expected
value R−1i . Each time the alarm goes off the agent revises her activity and switches
to activity j ∈ A with probability pij .
The objective of studying the macroscopic behavior of a system requires aver-
aging over all agents. In order to limit complexity, we make use of the continuum
hypothesis so that differential equations can be applied. Hence, we assume N very
large with the effect that the state space X can be approximated as continuous and
that the mean agent behavior can be approximated by expected behavior according
to the law of large numbers. Under these conditions, Sandholm (2006) derives the
macroscopic system behavior:
Definition 2.2.3 (Mean dynamic). Let G be a modified population game, and let ρ
be its revision protocol. The mean dynamic corresponding to G is
x˙i =
n∑
j=0
xjρji(x, t)− xi
n∑
j=0
ρij(x, t), i = 0, . . . , n, (2.3)
where x˙i denotes the time derivative of xi.
2.2.2 Application to a consumer market
Let us consider a market consisting of N consumers and n different products pro-
duced by some firms. Our focus is on the consumer side of the market, i. e. given
the firms’ behavior in the sense of product properties1 (e. g. price and quality) the
evolution of the market is governed by the consumers’ purchase decisions. Though
in principle the application of modified population games allows for time-dependent
product properties (i. e. time-varying firm strategies) and consumer characteristics,
we concentrate on a market with static parameters.
The consumers, who take the role of the agents in the modified population game,
own at most one good each, i. e. the different products are substitutes to them (but
not perfect substitutes, since they might differ in quality, appearance et cetera).
Their activity set comprises the activities “not owning any product”, denoted 0,
1Exogenously given prices can for instance be applied in a Bertrand competition for oligopolies.
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“owning good 1”, denoted 1, and so forth. The alarm clock of each consumer
announces the time when she can decide to buy a new product and hence to switch
her activity. Reasons can be a breakdown or a defect when owning a product or a
sudden interest in a product when currently being without any good. This suddenly
arising interest can come for instance from the desire to follow a fashion trend. Due
to the memorylessness of such incidents, the use of a Poisson alarm clock seems
most adequate to model their occurrence. Since the old products are broken, they
are disposed and therefore reselling is assumed to be impossible. Finally, let the
firms have—as is standard practice in industrial organization—perfect knowledge
about the consumer behavior depending on the product properties, and hence they
produce exactly as many goods as are demanded at any time.
2.2.3 The sales equation
We define Si(t) as the number of units of product i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, sold per time at
time t. Si shall be called the sales of product i.
The sales of product i correspond to the rate of consumers switching to or rather
buying this good,
Si(t) = N
[
xi(t)ρii(t) +
n∑
j=0
j 6=i
xj(t)ρji(t)
]
, i = 0, . . . , n. (2.4)
Using the mean dynamic (2.3), equation (2.4) can be transformed into the sales
equation, which describes the relationship between sales and consumer subpopula-
tions,
Si
N
= x˙i + xiRi, i = 0, . . . , n. (2.5)
To enhance intuition, the rate of change x˙i can be interpreted as the difference
between consumers adopting and abandoning good i, while the second summand
represents all those owners of good i who currently reorientate themselves and either
abandon or stick with2 product i. As the leaving consumers cancel, the net effect
consists of those consumers buying product i.
2Note that these consumers replace the broken unit they own and buy a new one.
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Let us provide a brief analysis of the sales equation: As indicated above, the
equation decomposes into a pair of additive terms, leading to two cases, each cor-
responding to one term outweighing the other. In the case of small xi, e. g. during
product launch, sales precisely reflect the increasing distribution among the pop-
ulation, e. g. due to growing product awareness. On the other hand, for negligible
x˙i (after reaching a comparatively stable situation) sales of good i solely originate
from replacements of both defect units of i and different products. The rate of
replacements is equivalent to the rate of consumer reorientation or revision, xiRi.
2.2.4 A consumer revision protocol and the resulting mean
dynamic
The specific revision protocol that we employ borrows well-established ideas from
social learning (Smallwood & Conlisk 1979, Ellison & Fudenberg 1995), psycho-
logical, experimental, and consumer research literature (Assael 1984). On a goods
market, there are mainly two factors influencing the buying behavior of a consumer,
the goods’ properties and their perceived distribution among other consumers. It
is, for example, beyond question that any purchase decision depends on the an-
ticipated product quality, including functionality, reliability, value for money, and
many further properties. Also, the life span of a product plays a role as it affects the
frequency of purchases. On the other hand, the product distribution among other
consumers may have an effect by simply determining the level of product awareness
or inducing a fashion or even networking. The revision protocol ought to reflect
these influences on the consumer behavior.
A revision protocol ρ(x, t) is uniquely defined by the product-dependent alarm
clock rates Ri and the switching probabilities pij(x, t), for which we shall suggest a
specification in the following.
The alarm clock rate represents the average frequency at which consumers think
about buying a specific product and hence replacing their old one—unless they
do not yet possess any good. Since this frequency depends on the durability of
the currently owned product, alarm clock rates in general differ from product to
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product. For simplicity, we shall assume the rates Ri to be given for each product i
and to be time-invariant. Typically, the frequency R0 of revisions without any good
is larger than the rate Ri of possible replacements of good i, since the goods usually
survive longer than the consumers without any good are satisfied.
Of those people, who do not own any product, the fraction of consumers de-
ciding to buy product i can be described by the switching probability p0i. When
consumers start thinking about buying a specific product they scan the market and
become susceptible to various types of information about possible alternatives. In
the accompanied decision process, passive and active decision mechanisms can be
distinguished: When consumers passively encounter a product, its level of familiar-
ity rises, thus increasing the possibility for this product to be bought. On the other
hand, consumers may actively imitate others in buying the same good since the pop-
ularity of a product might give information about the product’s past performance
(cf. Ellison & Fudenberg 1993), so that according to Smallwood & Conlisk (1979)
the consumers’ choices are sensitive to market shares or popularities of the prod-
ucts. Additionally, studies in social psychology support the individual’s conformity
to group norms, i. e. that consumers imitate group behavior (Assael 1984, p. 371ff).
Purely active, purely passive, and intermediate decision mechanisms are catego-
rized in the following. They imply a proportionality between the switching probabil-
ity p0i and the fraction xi of consumers currently owning product i. The mechanisms
are ordered from rather passive to rather active.
• In daily life, consumers encounter product i at a frequency proportional to its
distribution xi among the population. Hence, familiarity with the good and
proneness to buy it rise accordingly.
• A consumer’s idea of an ideal product is partly shaped by the surroundings.
Product characteristics often observed are commonly desired. The intensity of
influence by good i and thus proneness to buy it may be assumed proportional
to its frequency xi.
• Information about products can be obtained from various media (including
the Internet), e. g. experience is exchanged on product evaluation websites.
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The media in total roughly reflect the real world including the market; the
more widespread a product is, the more frequently the media report about it,
thereby increasing product awareness proportionally to xi.
• The expected quality of a product is often inferred from the number of sales,
assuming that superior products always find a ready market. The prevalently
perceived indicator is thus the observed distribution xi.
• Consumers also actively ask around their friends and let their purchase decision
be influenced by the found product distribution, which on average matches the
xi. For certain goods, networking may play a role as well, intrinsically implying
the positive effect of high xi on the sales of product i.
• Finally, a fashion might be induced by a high distribution of a specific product,
leading to even higher sales of that product.
Motivated by the above, we assume a linear relation between switching prob-
ability p0i and xi as a first approximation, that is p0i ∼ xi. The proportionality
factor, denoted ϕi, still remains to be determined. Generally, it differs from product
to product (Assael 1984, p. 432, 414) and can even be time dependent. We need
ϕi ∈ [0, 1], since
1 =
n∑
i=0
p0i = p00 +
n∑
i=1
ϕixi,
must also hold for any state xi = 1, xj 6=i = 0. ϕi constitutes the accumulated
influence of product frequency on the consumers’ purchase decision via all different
mechanisms. It can be interpreted as the intensity by which a consumer is convinced
during an encounter with the product and is therefore termed convincement factor
in the following. It is similar to an anticipated product quality. Of course, ϕi does
depend on the good properties as there are the price, the (expected) quality, the
strength of networking, and fashion effects for that product etc. To summarize,
p0i = ϕixi, i 6= 0. (2.6)
Let us now turn to those people owning product i. Someone who is content
with that good, tends to buy a new unit of that good when the alarm clock rings,
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even though a better product might exist. Surveying the market is time-consuming,
and furthermore, consumers usually act conservatively and avoid changes, so that
the same product i is bought. Assael (1984, p. 53) summarizes several studies
on the topic and comes to the conclusion that a form of habit evolves, leading
to repeat purchases of a product without further information search or evaluating
brand alternatives.
We may deduce that the fraction pii of consumers sticking to product i only de-
pends on the habit induced by this good or consumer sluggishness and is independent
of any other factors. Also, we assume this habit level to represent a characteristic
of the product, as justified by the fact that a consumer usually gets the more dis-
content with a product the more often it breaks down or the less satisfactory its
functionality seems. In our model, a fixed, product-specific percentage of consumers
will develop a buying habit, so that finally
pii = si ∈ [0, 1], i 6= 0. (2.7)
Obviously, the fraction of switching consumers (1− pii) divides up into the frac-
tions pij of people switching to product j 6= i. They behave just like those consumers
not yet owning any good, except that they do not purchase product i again. There-
fore,
pij = (1− pii)p0j
= (1− si)ϕjxj , i 6= 0 ∧ j 6= 0, i. (2.8)
The switching probabilities pi0 and p00 are now uniquely determined by the con-
straints
∑n
j=0 pij = 1, i = 0, . . . , n,
p00 = 1−
n∑
j=1
p0j = 1−
n∑
j=1
ϕjxj , (2.9)
pi0 = 1−
n∑
j=1
pij = (1− pii) (p00 + p0i) = (1− si)
(
1−
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
ϕjxj
)
. (2.10)
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For i = 1, . . . , n, the mean dynamic (2.3) eventually takes the form
x˙i = ρ0i +
n∑
j=1
xj(ρji − ρ0i)− xiRi
= xi
(
ϕiR0 − (1− si)Ri − ϕi
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
[R0 − (1− sj)Rj ]xj − ϕiR0xi
)
. (2.11)
This specific mean dynamic has Lotka-Volterra form3, x˙i = xi
(
ai −
∑n
j=1 bijxj
)
,
of competitive species with coefficients ai = ϕiR0 − (1 − si)Ri, bii = ϕiR0, and for
j 6= i, bij = ϕi [R0 − (1− sj)Rj ].
All constants Ri, ϕi, and si may in principle be time-dependent so that prod-
uct modifications or fashion trends can be modeled. However, for our theoretical
analysis, we assume the coefficients to be constant. Non-constant coefficients will
be dealt with in the next chapter. In particular, we will show how to interpret the
convincement factor ϕi via a demand function that is influenced by the product’s
price.
ϕi and si should be seen as the mean parameters over the entire population of
heterogeneous, boundedly rational agents. The probability ϕi, for example, may be
seen as that fraction of the heterogeneous population that is convinced by prod-
uct i. Even more, ϕi may also be seen as the probability of an individual to be
convinced, i. e. due to the individual’s bounded rationality her decision is not de-
terministic. Hence, the parameters incorporate both an individual variation and a
global variation over the population.
Modified population games with the consumer revision protocol motivated above
will frequently be used in the later model analysis. For simplicity we shall therefore
define the following:
Definition 2.2.4 (Habitual imitative consumers). Agents who follow the above re-
vision protocol (2.6) to (2.10) are called habitual imitative consumers. A modified
population game with such agents is called the demand side of a market with habitual
imitative consumers.
3The Lotka-Volterra equations represent a first-order, nonlinear system of differential equations
that is frequently used to model competing species in biology.
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Figure 2.1: Sketch of a typical behavior of x1 (left) and
S1
N ·R0
(right) in time.
2.3 Model analysis
2.3.1 Single good market
For the single good case, the mean dynamic has the following form
x˙1 = x1ϕ1R0 (Ψ− x1) , (2.12)
where Ψ = 1− R1
R0
1−s1
ϕ1
encodes the “quality” of the good (Ψ is large for high durabil-
ity, convincement, and habituation factor). The ordinary differential equation (2.12)
can be solved analytically. Using partial fraction expansion and separation of vari-
ables, we find
dx1
dt
= x1ϕ1R0(Ψ− x1)⇒ dx1
x1(Ψ− x1) = ϕ1R0dt
⇒
∫
1
x1(Ψ− x1)dx1 =
∫
ϕ1R0dt
⇒ ln
(
x1
Ψ− x1
)
= Ψϕ1R0t+ C1
⇒ x1 = Ψ
1 + C2 exp(−Ψϕ1R0t) ,
where via an initial condition at t = 0 the constants C1, C2 can be resolved according
to
x1(τ) =
Ψ
1 +
(
Ψ
x1(0)
− 1
)
exp [−τΨϕ1]
(2.13)
with dimensionless time τ = tR0. The evolution of the population x1 either has a
sigmoidal shape with initial exponential growth and saturation value Ψ (figure 2.1)
or—in case of an undesirable product—immediately decays to zero.
Definition 2.3.1 (Feasibility). We call a good feasible if a positive number of con-
sumers owns the product in the steady state.
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Figure 2.2: Transcritical bifurcation with stable (solid line) and unstable (dashed
line) steady state values of x1.
In this case, the number of sales is positive at least within a certain time period.
Mathematically, feasibility of a good is determined by the parameter Ψ, which can
readily be shown by investigating the stability of the (unique) steady states x1 = 0
and x1 = Ψ respectively. Figure 2.2 shows a transcritical bifurcation to occur at
Ψ = 0, which renders the steady state x1 = 0 instable and x1 = Ψ stable. Hence we
obtain:
Proposition 2.3.1. The single product on a market with habitual imitative con-
sumers is feasible if and only if Ψ > 0. 
The proposition states that for a product to survive its quality has to be suffi-
ciently high.4
The sales equation for the single good market with a feasible good takes the
explicit form
S1(τ)
N · R0 =
Ψ
1 +
(
Ψ
x1(0)
− 1
)
exp [−τΨϕ1]
[
R1
R0
+ ϕ1Ψ− ϕ1Ψ
1+
“
Ψ
x1(0)
−1
”
exp[−τΨϕ1]
]
(2.14)
with saturation value
lim
τ→∞
S1(τ)
N · R0 = Ψ
R1
R0
. (2.15)
We may assume that the initial condition x1(0) > 0 is near zero. Depending on
R1
R0
· 2−s1
ϕ1
, the sales can take qualitatively different shapes (figure 2.1 right) corre-
sponding to different patterns of monopoly product life cycles:
For R1
R0
· 2−s1
ϕ1
< 1 we find an initial exponential growth, a maximum, and then
a decay with saturation. Intuitively, the stronger the effect of habituation s1 or
imitation ϕ1 (i. e. the more convincing the product is), the stronger is the increase
4Note that Ψ ∈ (−∞, 1].
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Figure 2.3: Comparative statics of S1
N ·R0
with respect to the parameters s1, ϕ1,
R1
R0
, and R1
R0
· 2−s1
ϕ1
. In each graph, the fixed parameters have the values R1
R0
= 1,
x1(0) = 0.001, ϕ1 = 0.9, s1 = 0.99. The arrows indicate the variation of the curve
for an increasing parameter value, where the parameter values of s1 and ϕ1 are
varied from zero to one in steps of 0.05 and the values of R1
R0
and R1
R0
· 2−s1
ϕ1
are varied
from zero to two in steps of 0.1.
of the subpopulation. After a maximum is reached, however, the effect of product
durability gains in importance, since most purchases are replacements of broken
products. Hence, the sales decrease and approach a saturation value. In the special
case R1
R0
· 2−s1
ϕ1
= 0 of an infinitely durable good (R1 = 0), the saturation value is zero
since once the good is bought, the consumer owns it forever and does not purchase
another unit of this product.
For R1
R0
· 2−s1
ϕ1
≥ 1 the curve is sigmoidal. In this case habit and imitation cause
an initial increase, then the good has to be replaced quite often and a saturation
value is approached.
S1 is uniquely determined by three parameters, s1, ϕ1, and
R1
R0
, which together
with R1
R0
· 2−s1
ϕ1
lend themselves for a comparative statics analysis (figure 2.3). Gen-
erally, the time scale inherent in the sales evolution decreases for rising ϕ1, s1,
R1
R0
,
R1
R0
· 2−s1
ϕ1
(i. e. the system becomes faster), and the saturation value increases, which
can also be directly inferred from equation (2.15) and the mean dynamic (2.12).
The effect is especially sensitive to changes in ϕ1. These results are intuitive, since
rising habit, imitation, and replacement rates are indeed expected to speed up the
system and to cause more frequent purchases.
A single product market can be a model of different firm constellations: Either a
monopoly (at a regulated price) produces the good or an oligopoly, where all firms
produce exactly the same good and the brands do not influence the consumers’
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decision (the consumers do not even differentiate between them by any means).
2.3.2 Two goods market
In the two goods market, the mean dynamic has the form
x˙i = xiϕiR0 [Ψi − xi − Φjxj ] , i = 1, 2, j 6= i, (2.16)
where the Φj = 1−RjR0 (1−sj) are the slopes of the nullclines (or zero-growth isoclines)
in the corresponding phase plane (i. e. the lines along which x˙i = 0, see figure 2.4)
and the Ψi = 1 − RiR0 1−siϕi are the intersections of nullclines with the axes and thus
represent the respective saturation values of the single good case. Obviously, the Ψi
have to be positive for feasible goods, which we will assume in the following.
Phase planes are a representation of the dynamic system in which the nullclines
divide the state space into regions with x˙i > 0 and x˙i < 0. Steady states are given
by the intersection points x = (x1, x2) of nullclines x˙1 = 0 and x˙2 = 0. Obviously,
in the two goods case there are four possible distinct steady states,
xA =
(
Ψ1 − Φ2Ψ2
1− Φ1Φ2 ,
Ψ2 − Φ1Ψ1
1− Φ1Φ2
)
, xB = (0,Ψ2) , x
C = (Ψ1, 0) , x
D = (0, 0).
xD, the trivial steady state, is instable. For a stability analysis of the other steady
states, two cases have to be distinguished, xA ∈ R2≥0 := {(x1, x2) ∈ R2|x1, x2 ≥ 0}
and xA 6∈ R2≥0 respectively (cf. figure 2.4). For the description of the time evolution
of populations x1 and x2 and the according product life cycles we may again assume
x1(0), x2(0) > 0 to be near zero.
1. xA ∈ R2≥0. This is possible if either the denominators and numerators of xA1
and xA2 are all positive (1a) or all zero (1b), in which case the nullclines lie on
top of each other.
(a) 1 > Φ1Φ2, Ψ1 > Φ2Ψ2, Ψ2 > Φ1Ψ1 (figure 2.4 left). The only stable
steady state is xA. Hence the products coexist lastingly on the market.
Depending on the initial condition, x1 or x2 may have a maximum before
approaching the saturation value; the form of the trajectory strongly
depends on its starting point.
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Figure 2.4: Phase planes for all three possible cases 1a, 1b, 2 (from left to right),
with nullclines (solid lines) and one trajectory (dotted line) starting near zero each.
The (asymptotically) stable steady states are indicated by filled circles. Resulting
product life cycles are displayed beneath each diagram.
For the product life cycles—similarly to the single good case—a max-
imum may or may not exist depending on the parameter values. The
number of products sold initially and overall strongly depends on the
initial condition.
(b) 1 = Φ1Φ2, Ψ1 = Φ2Ψ2, Ψ2 = Φ1Ψ1 (figure 2.4 middle). This case
occurs for either Ri = 0 or si = 1 for i = 1, 2, i. e. for infinitely durable
goods or perfect habituation. xA degenerates to a continuous line of (not
asymptotically) stable steady states. x1(t) and x2(t) are monotonous,
while the sales evolution may exhibit a maximum depending on the Ri.
For infinitely durable goods (Ri = 0, i = 1, 2) the sales eventually ap-
proach zero.
2. xA /∈ R2≥0 (figure 2.4 right). Without loss of generality let Ψ1 > Φ2Ψ2 (other-
wise simply renumber the species; Ψ1 < Φ2Ψ2 and Ψ2 < Φ1Ψ1 is not possible
for Φi ≤ 1). Since either xA1 or xA2 has to be negative to prevent an intersection
of nullclines in R2≥0, this implies 1 = Φ1Φ2 or Ψ2 < Φ1Ψ1. x
C is stable and
xB is instable (reverse for Ψ1 < Φ2Ψ2 and Ψ2 > Φ1Ψ1). Hence, one product
(here product 2) dies out and the other product survives on the market. For
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Figure 2.5: Bifurcation diagram. (1a) represents the coexistence region of both
products, good 2 dies out in (2a) and good 1 in (2b). The region below Φ1Φ2 = 1
cannot be reached.
the vanishing product, both the subpopulation and sales reach a maximum
and then approach zero. The corresponding curves of the surviving product
qualitatively behave as in the single good case. The total sales of the inferior
product strongly depend on the initial condition.
The bifurcation diagram in figure 2.5 illustrates the parameter regions for the
different cases, in particular the region of coexistence (1a,1b) and the region of
exclusion of a product (2). The following proposition can immediately be inferred:
Proposition 2.3.2. Product 1 is feasible on a two goods market with habitual im-
itative consumers, if and only if either Ψ1 > 0 and Ψ2 ≤ 0 or Ψ1 > Φ2Ψ2. The
analogous result holds for product 2. 
Since Ψi encodes the “quality” of the good (Ψi is large for high durability, con-
vincement, and habituation factor), the previous proposition basically performs a
comparison of product qualities. However, due to the consumers’ heterogeneity and
bounded rationality, the “quality” of one good need only be larger than the “qual-
ity” of the other downscaled by a factor Φj , which is monotonously increasing with
the habit induction by the competing product. That is, also the weaker product can
survive since Φi ≤ 1.
A further, quite intuitive result follows directly from the phase planes in fig-
ure 2.4:
Proposition 2.3.3. If a new product enters a single good market with habitual
imitative consumers, the steady state market share of the incumbent decreases, while
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the joint market share of entrant and incumbent increases. Formally,
x∗i ≤ Ψi = x⋆i ≤ x∗1 + x∗2, i = 1, 2, (2.17)
where x∗i is the (or a) stable steady state value of xi in the two goods market and x
⋆
i
the steady state value in the single good market. 
As in the single good case, a two product market can model different firm con-
stellations: There might be a monopoly producing both goods, or the products are
offered by a duopoly or even oligopoly, but with only two distinguishable goods.
Equation (2.17) suggests that it might be beneficial for a monopoly to offer a vari-
ety of goods instead of just one (due to their bounded rationality this even holds for
completely homogeneous consumers, in which case a single, optimally fitted product
would seem more profitable at first glance).
2.3.3 Structural stability
The question arises how robust the dynamic system (2.11) is when small pertur-
bations occur, for instance when consumers change their behavior slightly. The
idea of structural stability is the appropriate tool to tackle this question. A struc-
turally stable system maintains its qualitative properties despite small perturbations
(Guckenheimer & Holmes 1990). In fact, structural stability of a dynamical system
means that the structure and topology of the phase portrait (e. g. the number and
type of steady states) stay the same if its parameters are varied. This is a general
concept: Mathematical models may not be too sensitive to variations of their in-
put data since input data is never completely reliable so that the results would be
questionable.
Let us here focus on the case (2.16) of a two goods market. Structural stability of
a two-dimensional system was examined in the pioneer work Andronov & Pontrjagin
(1937), which includes a necessary and sufficient condition for structural stability:
1. finite number of equilibrium points and closed orbits which are all hyperbolic
2. no trajectories connecting saddle points
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To show structural stability of the dynamic system given in (2.16), we have to check
both conditions. We can directly conclude from figure 2.4 middle, that the rather
academic case 1b is not structurally stable: Changing the parameters a bit, we
directly arrive at the structurally different cases 1a or 2 (figure 2.4 left and right).
As shown in section 2.3.2, for all other cases, a finite number (maximum four,
depending on the habit and imitation parameter values) of steady states exists, and
figure 2.4 obviously shows that there are no trajectories between saddle points and
no closed orbits (limit cycles). Additionally, all steady states are hyperbolic, since
all eigenvalues are real and nonzero, except for the two cases Ψi = Φ3−iΨ3−i, i = 1, 2,
which represent the bifurcation point between the cases 1a and 2. Hence, away from
these cases, the dynamic system (2.16) is structurally stable.
2.3.4 n goods market
Extension to multi-goods markets, where the mean dynamic takes the form
x˙i = xiϕiR0
[
Ψi − xi −
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
Φjxj
]
, i = 1, . . . , n, (2.18)
is obvious and will therefore be kept brief here. We will only derive the feasibility
condition for the nth good (and hence for any good after renumbering) and take a
look at the special case of a symmetric market. In the following, we will abbreviate
vectors of scalars according to (σi)i=1,...,m = ~σ. Also, we will need the following
lemma, whose proof is given in the appendix:
Lemma 2.3.4. Let 0 < Φi < 1 and let An for n ∈ N be the matrix defined as
(An)ij =
{
1, i = j,
Φj , i 6= j,
i, j = 1 . . . n.
Then det(An) > 0.
Now we can characterize the feasibility of a good:
Proposition 2.3.5. Consider an n-product market with habitual imitative con-
sumers on which the products i, i = 1, . . . , n − 1, coexist with 0 < Φi < 1. Then
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product n is feasible if and only if
Ψn > A
−1
n−1
~Ψ · ~Φ = ~˜x · ~Φ =
n−1∑
i=1
Φix˜i for (An−1)ij =
{
1, i = j,
Φj , i 6= j,
i, j = 1, . . . , n− 1
where ~˜x is the vector of market shares on the (n − 1)-goods market (i. e. without
product n).
In this proposition, the identity A−1n−1(Ψ1, . . . ,Ψn−1)
T = (x˜1, . . . , x˜n−1)
T results
from the steady state equations of the mean dynamic (2.18) for the (n − 1)-goods
market if all market shares are non-zero. Hence, intuitively, the above proposition
implies that the (hypothetic) monopoly market share Ψn has to be larger than the
weighted sum of market shares of products 1 to n−1, where the weights Φi increase
with habit induction. The proof is deferred to the appendix.
For a sensible market model, we postulate that it be consistent with economic
intuition. The next few lines are devoted to such a proof of consistency: We aim
to show the intuitive fact that competition becomes harder when another competi-
tor enters the market. For this purpose, let Ψ¯n−1 be the feasibility boundary from
proposition 2.3.5 for an nth product to enter a market with n − 1 existing prod-
ucts and with habitual imitative consumers. Furthermore, let Ψ¯n−2,j be the same
feasibility boundary, however, only for entering a market with just n − 2 existing
products, namely all products from the (n− 1)-goods market except for product j.
Then the following lemma can be proven:
Lemma 2.3.6. Under the conditions of the previous proposition 2.3.5 and with Ψ¯n−1
and Ψ¯n−2,j as just defined,
Ψ¯n−1 − Ψ¯n−2,j =
n−1∏
i=1
i6=j
(1− Φi)(Ψj − Ψ¯n−2,j) Φj
det(An−1)
.

We shall not give the tedious proof here, however, the reader may easily verify
the relation by trying out different n. This lemma now yields the desired result:
Proposition 2.3.7. Under the conditions of lemma 2.3.6, competition gets harder
the more competitors enter the market, i. e.
Ψ¯n−1 > Ψ¯n−2,j for all j = 1, . . . n− 1.
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Hence, it is harder to enter the (n−1)-goods market than it is to enter the same
market, but with any one of the products removed.
Proof. (1−Φi) is positive due to 0 < Φi < 1. (Ψj−Ψ¯n−2,j) is positive since otherwise
product j would not be feasible and would hence not exist. Thus the result follows
from lemma 2.3.6 together with lemma 2.3.4.
We shall now briefly provide a further interpretation of the feasibility condition
in proposition 2.3.5: Analogously to Ψ¯n−2,j, let the matrix An−2,j be defined by
omitting the jth row and the jth column of matrix An−1. Furthermore, let matrix
(An)i→~Ψ be equal to An with column i replaced by
~Ψ, let the vector of ones be
denoted by ~1 and let M6i, 6j denote a matrix M with the ith row and jth column
removed. Then
det(An−1)Ψ¯n−1 =
n−1∑
i,j=1
i6=j
(−1)i+jΦiΨiΦj det(((An−1)j→~1) 6j, 6i) +
n−1∑
i=1
ΦiΨi det((An−1) 6i, 6i)
=
n−1∑
j=1
[
−
n−1∑
i=1
i6=j
(−1)i+jΦiΨiΦj
(
(−1)i+j det((An−2,j)i→~1)
)
+ ΦjΨj det(An−2,j)
]
=
n−1∑
j=1
[−Ψ¯n−2,jΦj det(An−2,j) + ΦjΨj det(An−2,j)]
=
n−1∑
j=1
Φj det(An−2,j)
[
Ψj − Ψ¯n−2,j
]
.
Hence, the lower feasibility bound Ψ¯n−1 can be interpreted as the weighted sum
of the feasibilities (Ψj − Ψ¯n−2,j) of all existing products, as (Ψj − Ψ¯n−2,j) indeed
expresses how much more feasible good j is in comparison with the minimum to
exist on the market.
In the special case of a symmetric market with n − 1 identical products, A−1n−1
has a simple form, which allows to look at proposition 2.3.5 from a slightly differ-
ent viewpoint. The following corollary compares the quality of the entrant with
the quality of the incumbents and enables us to examine this relation for growing
numbers of products.
Corollary 2.3.8. Consider a symmetric (n−1)-product market with identical firms
(Φi = Φ, Ψi = Ψ) and habitual imitative consumers on which the products coexist
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with 0 < Φ < 1. Then a new (not necessarily identical) nth product is feasible if
and only if
Ψn >
(n− 1)ΦΨ
1 + (n− 2)Φ .
Proof. By calculating A−1n−1An−1 we can readily verify
(A−1n−1)ij =
{
(n−3)Φ+1
(1−Φ)[1+(n−2)Φ]
, i = j,
−Φ
(1−Φ)[1+(n−2)Φ]
, i 6= j.
Hence, by proposition 2.3.5,
Ψn > A
−1
n−1
~Ψ · ~Φ = (n− 1)ΦΨ
1 + (n− 2)Φ .
Obviously, the “quality” Ψn of the new nth product may always be smaller than
the “quality” Ψ of the n−1 incumbents. However, the factor (n−1)ΦΨ
1+(n−2)Φ
monotonously
increases with the number of products n, and in the limit
Ψn >
(n− 1)ΦΨ
1 + (n− 2)Φ
n→∞−→ Ψ
so that the entrant’s “quality” has to approach the incumbents’ “quality” Ψ.
2.4 Discussion
So far we have worked out how the sales dynamics of products or brands evolve in an
environment with habitual imitative consumers and how this evolution is influenced
by the product-dependent habit and imitation parameters. In this section we shall
briefly mention further implications for firms deduced from the model.
For non-varying products and thus fixed habit and imitation parameter val-
ues, the final steady state cannot be influenced by the firms (unless the parameter
values are functions ϕi(x1, . . . , xn), si(x1, . . . , xn) of the state so that the mean dy-
namic (2.11) no longer has Lotka-Volterra form). Nevertheless, a moderately large
initial share xi(t = 0) generally is profitable for firms (i. e. it pays off to give away
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a number of product units for free initially) in order to sell more product units on
the whole. The effect arises, because a larger initial product share leads to a faster
approach to the steady state. Similarly, it pays off for a firm to launch a product
early in comparison to the competitors in order to have a large market share when
the other products enter the market. This causes sales advantages such as the initial
hump in figure 2.4 (left).
Of course any real market which is to be modeled needs careful choice of habit,
imitation, and durability parameters. Such parameters can be obtained from match-
ing empirical curves with simulated sales development, for instance using the ob-
served time scales and steady state market shares. As an example consider the
evolution of consumption of filter cigarettes as found in Polli & Cook (1969, p. 389).
Here we will regard filter cigarettes as a product class within which brand differences
(at least initially) do not matter much so that a monopoly approximation may be
appropriate (i. e. there are only two options: buying or not buying filter cigarettes).
The fact that habit plays a strong role here is unquestionable (and rumor has it that
imitation takes place as well). To fit the data, we roughly estimated a high (packet)
consumption rate of R1 = 200 per year and a rather low consideration frequency of
R0 = 20 per year as well as a low imitation of ϕ1 = 0.01, which seem reasonable
values. Habit on the other hand is close to one with s1 = 0.9992. This results
in x1 = 20% of the population smoking filter cigarettes in the steady state, which
seems a reasonable estimate considering that according to Polli & Cook (1969) in
the 1960s filter cigarettes consumption amounted to roughly 40% of total cigarette
consumption (and nearly half the US population were smokers). The resulting sales
evolution is given in figure 2.6. It closely imitates the empirical curve for plain filter
cigarettes in Polli & Cook (1969, p. 389, figure 3).
The next chapter will additionally model the supply side of the market and
analyze firms’ pricing or advertising strategies as well as the welfare in such a market.
Moreover, we will show how product life cycles of the typically empirically supported
form can be generated in a market with habitual imitative consumers.
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Figure 2.6: Simulation results, reproducing the sales evolution of plain filter
cigarettes in the USA from Polli&Cook (1969).
2.5 Conclusion
We examined the evolution of a consumer market, where boundedly rational con-
sumers follow rules of thumb, basing their decisions on imitation and habit. To
achieve this goal we set up a modified population game with a corresponding re-
vision protocol as framework. We then analyzed the resulting sales evolution of
products and investigated product feasibility in a market with habitual imitative
consumers. The behavioral parameters can be adapted to match observed sales evo-
lutions of products or product classes, and the introduced methodology allows for
broad applications and qualitative theoretical analysis. In particular, demand by
habitual imitative consumers will serve as the basis for modeling a strategic supply
side in the next chapter.
One of the main achievements of this chapter consists in having cast psychological
and experimental results into a mathematical model with boundedly rational and
habitual imitative consumers, as well as investigation of the consequences. For
example, such a market model is shown to be consistent with standard economic
intuition in that it becomes more difficult for products to survive on the market the
more competitors enter the market.
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Chapter 3
Product Pricing when Demand
Follows a Rule of Thumb
3.1 Introduction
In many situations, strategic pricing represents a difficult task for firms, especially if
the consumers are not known to strictly follow a given demand function. In reality,
consumers behave boundedly rationally as observed in numerous psychological and
experimental investigations (cf. Conlisk 1996) and appreciated in some areas of in-
dustrial organization (cf. Ellison 2006). In this chapter, we examine a model which
describes how firms shall optimally, i. e. strategically, set their prices or advertising
levels when confronted with habitual imitative consumers. Such consumers imitate
popular product choices and form a habit to repeatedly purchase the same prod-
uct. This rule of thumb behavior is psychologically supported (Assael 1984) and
acknowledged in the economic literature (e. g. Stigler & Becker 1977, Schlag 1998).
The demand side of a market with habitual imitative consumers has been exam-
ined in the previous chapter. There we have shown—using imitation and habit as the
only model ingredients—under which conditions a product is feasible (i. e. has suffi-
cient demand to survive lastingly on the market), which types of sales curves can be
generated, and how the imitative and habitual parameters influence feasibility and
sales evolution. The corresponding model has been stated in form of a population
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game as defined in Sandholm (2005), using the fact that for a large population size
the stochastic process generated by the evolutionary process can be approximated
by solutions to ordinary differential equations (Bena¨ım & Weibull 2003).
For a complete market description, the demand side is here complemented with
a supply side model. The demand side consists of the continuous-time consumer
population game from the previous chapter. The game of the supply side describes
the strategic behavior of firms, which anticipate the consumers’ behavior and thus
the demand dynamics. With such a description at hand, we can then transfer the
concept of welfare into this framework, examine how advertising might influence the
results, and show that the model is consistent with observed market patterns such
as product life cycles.
As motivated earlier, in a consumer–seller relationship the strategic variables
(e. g. price, quality, output) are determined by the firms. Any influencing parame-
ter on the demand side (such as personal preference or reservation price) is fixed,
i. e. exogenous in a market model. Hence, due to their reactive role, consumers
naturally do not compete actively with each other or with firms, which prohibits a
conventional game theoretic demand side model. In contrast, for the firms a strategic
behavior of determining the degrees of freedom can be devised using game theoretic
approaches. In particular, we apply a differential game in order to model the firms’
behavior.
This chapter aims at providing an insight into the strategic response of firms
when confronted with demand dynamics generated by the imitative and habitual
consumer behavior. The consumer model is in the spirit of Smallwood & Conlisk
(1979) as well as von Thadden (1992) in that the consumers are unable or not willing
to act strategically and thus act adaptively. Our rational supply side approach differs
in methodology. We employ a normal form game in which firms choose a time-
continuous price path at the beginning of the game and gain an according profit.
(This could easily be extended to repeated choices of price paths.) A more classic
normal form game, which describes a single discrete time step, would not exploit
the full richness of the model since the time-continuous demand side calls for at
least a continuous-time price path. At the other extreme, a steady price adjustment
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at all points in time is rather unrealistic since a firm can hardly react continuously
without time lag (though, nonetheless, the proposed model will be able to capture
even this case). By letting the firms fix a price path at the beginning of the game
(e. g. for a certain time period, which is represented by the duration of the game),
we strike a balance between both extremes.
We employ a differential game, i. e. a time-continuous game where the state vari-
ables (here the consumer subpopulation sizes) follow first-order ordinary differential
equations. More specifically, the chosen product prices (control variables) deter-
mine the rate of change in consumer subpopulation sizes (state variables), where
consumers are grouped into subpopulations according to the product they own.
Technically, there is no effect in the opposite direction, which renders the dynam-
ics an open-loop system. However, in a deterministic setting we have equivalence
of open and closed loops. This is convenient since closed loops are considered—in
contrast to static open loops—as being genuinely strategic since they comprise a
feedback in which the control variables are affected by the state variables.
In this context, the following result turns out to be very interesting: The firms’
action space generally contains all possible price paths and thus is very complex.
However, for a monopoly we will show that a Nash equilibrium often lies in the re-
duced space of time-constant prices. This justifies that most of the time we return to
time-constant price paths and steady state analysis. Nevertheless, we additionally
analyze some exemplary cases with general price paths. Moreover, we will see that
markets with imitative and habitual consumers behave naturally in that e. g. an in-
creasing number of firms enhances competition and reduces prices. However, perfect
competition is generally only achieved in symmetric markets. Finally, advertising
is shown to be an effective method to sustain demand, and a welfare definition is
suggested.
3.1.1 Further motivation and related literature
Boundedly rational consumer behavior—as advocated by Ellison (2006), Conlisk
(1996), and many others—is often observed in consumer research, in particular
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imitation of group behavior or habitual purchase (cf. Assael 1984, p. 371ff, 53).
Just to mention some exemplary laboratory experiments, Venkatesan (1966) shows
that consumers generally conform to group norms and Corriveau et al. (2009) find a
sensibility to group consensus for young children. Pingle & Day (1996) summarize
experiments which show that boundedly rational behavior such as imitation and
habit (which they call “economic choices in reality”) represents means in order to
get well-performing economic choices in presence of decision costs. Our focus here
lies on markets with boundedly rational consumers that follow habitual imitative
decision rules as introduced in the previous chapter.
Closely related to the demand dynamic employed here is the model by Smallwood
& Conlisk (1979). They consider consumers who buy the same product each period
until a breakdown occurs. Then, they choose another product depending on its
market share. It is examined how strongly the consumers should rely on product
popularities. Despite having been published in 1979 already, there is still social
learning literature building on this model, for example Ellison & Fudenberg (1995).
Imitative behavior in general constitutes a well-known and frequently used con-
cept in evolutionary game theory and social learning, compare for instance Schlag
(1998), Ellison & Fudenberg (1993), and Banerjee (1992), just to name a few no-
table papers. Habit, on the other hand, occurs in the habit formation literature
(Heaton 1993) as well as implicitly in some industrial organization models (for in-
stance in Smallwood & Conlisk 1979, where habit is implicitly formed as long as
no breakdown occurs). Habit may also be interpreted as a special case of learning,
since agents learn from past experience (Sobel 2000, p. 257) and positive experience
with a good may cause habitual purchase behavior.
Firms are usually more rational than consumers can or aim to be. The reason
lies in the large number of people and equipment that are employed in order to avoid
costly wrong decisions. The approximation of rational firms seems reasonable, even
though some early work in the field of bounded rationality assumes the opposite,
i. e. boundedly rational firms (e.g. Rothschild 1947, Cyert & March 1956). However,
in line with most of the recent literature, we restrict bounded rationality to the
consumers and assume fully rational firms (Ellison 2006, p. 4), i. e. our firms aim
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at maximizing their profits given the demand side and the pricing strategies of the
competitors, modeled via a differential game as introduced by Isaacs (1954). In
combination with the two previously mentioned simple rule of thumb ingredients,
imitation and habit by consumers, the model will be able to generate typical patterns
observed in consumer markets such as product life cycles (de Kluyver 1977, Brockhoff
1967, Polli & Cook 1969).
The outline of this chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the competition
game played by the supply side. The game is first applied to exemplary monopoly
or oligopoly settings, after which more general results and conclusions are drawn for
the monopoly and oligopoly case. In section 3.3, an adequate welfare definition is
provided, and a possible generation of product life cycles is described. Additionally,
a model extension by advertising is suggested. Finally, we conclude in section 3.4.
3.2 Strategic pricing in a monopoly & oligopoly
Let us examine markets in which firms anticipate the consumers’ actions (indeed,
companies do try to predict consumer behavior) and set their prices accordingly.
Naturally, the imitation factor ϕi and habit coefficient si (see previous chapter)
depend on the good prices, i. e. ϕi = ϕi(ξ1(t), . . . , ξn(t)), si = si(ξ1(t), . . . , ξn(t)),
i = 1, . . . , n, where the price of good j at time t is denoted ξj(t). To keep things
simple while staying sufficiently realistic, we shall assume ϕi and si to depend on ξi
only. The consumers see the prices of all goods, and the probability to buy product
i (encoded by ϕi and si) rises with falling price ξi. They behave like many small iron
particles which are attracted by different magnets, representing the products. The
strength of a magnet relative to its competitors determines the eventual amount of
trapped particles, which illustrates the mechanism of competition. Competing firms
will seek a compromise between large margins and sufficiently low prices to attract
consumers more strongly than their competitors (via high ϕi and si).
Recall that the imitation function ϕi(ξi) has the following interpretation: A con-
sumer owning no good or switching products imitates the population of consumers
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owning good i with probability ϕi(ξi). Equivalently, the fraction ϕi(ξi) of the whole
population would purchase good i at a price of ξi. Obviously, ϕi(ξi) represents the
normalized demand function of product i, or in probabilistic terms, ϕi(ξi) is the
demand distribution of product i. Hence, let us agree upon the following
Condition 3.2.1. In a market with habitual imitative consumers, let ϕi(~ξ) and
si(~ξ) denote the imitation and habit coefficient for product i, depending on the vector
~ξ=(ξ1,. . ., ξn) of product prices. Then ϕi and si are monotonously decreasing in ξi.
In the following we will abbreviate vectors of scalars according to (σi)i=1,...,m = ~σ.
We are now able to describe a normal form competition game of the firms.
Definition 3.2.2 (Normal form competition game). The normal form competition
game in a market with habitual imitative consumers is a normal form game G =
(n,S,Π) with
• the number of agents n being the number of firms, where each firm produces one
product and the products are understood to be characterized by the functions
si(ξ1, . . . , ξn) and ϕi(ξ1, . . . , ξn),
• the set S of all possible strategy combinations with S ⊆ [RR++ ]n=RR++ ×· · ·×RR++
(a subset of the space of n-tuples over maps ξi : R+ → R+, t 7→ ξi(t), where
ξi(t) denotes the price of good i at time t),
• the utility function
Π : S → Rn+, Πi(ξ1, . . . , ξn) = F
[
(ξi(t)− ci)Si
(
~s(~ξ(t)), ~ϕ(~ξ(t)), ~x(t)
)]
,
being the firms’ profit, where there are no fixed costs, ci denotes
the (time-independent) marginal cost of production for good i, and
~S(~s(~ξ(t)), ~ϕ(~ξ(t)), ~x(t)) ≡ ~S(t, ~x(0)) is the sales vector (cf. (2.4)) belong-
ing to the population game (2.18) with ρ defined by (2.6) to (2.10). The
operator F : RR+ → R+, which assigns a nonnegative real number to each
map f : R+ → R, may assume different forms.
The imitation and habit function ~ϕ(~ξ) and ~s(~ξ) may in general be time depen-
dent. The operator F can e. g. constitute the cumulated discounted profit over a
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certain time period [0, T ],
FT [π(·)] =
∫ T
0
exp[−rt]π(t)dt,
where π(t) represents the firm’s profit at time t. For an infinite time horizon this is
extended to
F∞ [π(·)] =
∫ ∞
0
exp[−rt]π(t)dt.
For a zero discount rate r, the latter definition is not well-defined. In this case we
resort to the long-term profit rate,
F∂ [π(·)] = lim
T→∞
1
T
∫ T
0
π(t)dt = lim
t→∞
π(t),
where the last expression only holds for time-invariant prices in the steady state. In
this case (which is for example of interest when the firms would like to validate their
prices in an equilibrated market), we will also denote F∂ as the steady state profit.
Note that definition 3.2.2 in conjunction with (2.18) defines a differential game
as in Isaacs (1954).
Definition 3.2.2 allows for a time-dependent price. The firms set their price
paths initially and then strictly follow these. The lack of opportunities for price
path revisions implies no disadvantage for the firms, since the consumer model is
deterministic and consumer behavior thus predictable. Therefore, even if the firms
would be able to change their price paths during the game, they would not do so
unless the market conditions were changed by an external event. (Such price path
revisions could readily be modeled by extending the normal form competition game
to a repeated game.) Put differently, assume the optimal pricing strategies to be
functions of the state also, i. e. ~ξ = ~ξ(~x, t), which would correspond to a closed-loop
model in which the price path is continuously adapted according to the current state.
Then, the corresponding optimal path in state space, ~x(t), could be computed by
solving the mean dynamic (2.18). Choosing ξˆ(t) = ~ξ(~x(t), t), we obtain the optimal
open-loop control path, which is exactly equivalent to the corresponding closed-loop
path. (Note that this would be different for models with non-Markovian strategies
and positive time lags between a firm’s action and the others’ reaction, in which
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case trigger strategies, i. e. punishment after path deviation of a competitor, might
exist, cf. Dockner et al. (2001).)
Obviously, firms do not at each time maximize their current profit, but choose
their price paths in order to obtain an optimal overall profit in the long run.
3.2.1 Monopoly
As a first illustrative example, let us consider the simplest case possible, the
monopoly with fixed prices (as in equilibrated or price-restricted markets). The
monopoly strategy space thus reduces to the space S = R+ of time-constant price
functions ξ1(t) = ξ1. For given ϕ1(ξ1), s1(ξ1) the Nash equilibrium with steady state
profit now yields an optimum monopoly price (corresponding oligopoly prices are
addressed in the next section).
Example 3.2.1 (Steady state monopoly price). Consider the normal form compe-
tition game
G = (1,R+, F∂[π(·)]) =
(
1,R+, lim
t→∞
(ξ1 − c1)S1(s1, ϕ1(ξ1), t)
)
,
with S = R+ representing the set of all constant price functions in R+. Let us as-
sume a constant habit function s1(ξ1) = s1 and the generic piecewise affine imitation
function ϕ1(ξ1) = max
(
0, 1− ξ1
Ξ1
)
with maximum reservation price Ξ1 ≥ c1. The
price in the (unique) Nash-equilibrium is the maximizer of
max
ξ1∈R+
[
lim
t→∞
(ξ1 − c1)S1(s1, ϕ1(ξ1), t)
]
,
where S1 follows from equation (2.5) with x1(t) =
Ψ1
1+
“
Ψ1
x1(0)
−1
”
exp[−tR0Ψ1ϕ1]
solving the
ordinary differential equation (2.12). The optimal price is given by
ξ∗1 = Ξ1 −
√
R1
R0
(1− s1)Ξ1(Ξ1 − c1) if ξ∗1 > c1.
For ξ∗1 < c1 the firm is recommended not to produce. The product therefore is feasible,
if and only if c1 ≤ Ξ1
[
1− R1
R0
(1− s1)
]
.1
1This is just a different representation of the feasibility condition Ψ1[ξ1 = c1] > 0 from the
previous chapter.
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Of course, the constant s1 in the above example is a very crude approximation
(though reasonable if a certain range of prices is not exceeded), since then, obviously,
the monopolist could gain infinite profit by suddenly charging infinite prices (which
the consumers will pay due to their habit). Hence, when looking at time dependent
prices, one should for example set s1(ξ1) = ϕ1(ξ1).
A product is feasible if it persists in the steady state and the firm does not make
any losses when selling the good. The feasibility condition from the above example
naturally extends to a result for general ϕ1(ξ1) and s1(ξ1).
Proposition 3.2.1. The single product on the market with habitual imitative con-
sumers is feasible if and only if Ψ1[ξ1 = c1] > 0.
Proof. Due to condition 3.2.1, ϕ1 and s1 are monotonously decreasing with ξ1.
Hence, Ψ1 is so as well. Also, in proposition 2.3.1 we have shown that a sin-
gle product on a market is feasible if and only if Ψ1 > 0. Hence, if and only if
Ψ1[ξ1 = c1] > 0, there exist prices ξ1 for which the firm makes a positive profit.
The previous example of an equilibrated monopoly market did not exploit the
possibility of time-varying prices. Yet, it might very well be that non-constant prices
result in a higher profit: A widely observed pricing strategy consists in charging an
elevated price most of the time with (more or less regular) intermittent special offers.
This strategy probably aims at making people buy the product during the low-price
period and thereby inducing a habit for the high-price period. However, for periodic
price changes we will show that in a market with habitual imitative consumers a
Nash equilibrium is found to lie in the space of time-constant prices, which in many
cases justifies to a priori confine ourselves to steady states and constant pricing. To
show this, we will proceed in steps and first prove the criticality, later the optimality
of a constant price.
Proposition 3.2.2. Let us consider a monopoly market with habitual imitative
consumers in which the firm has a periodic price path, i. e. in each time period
[kT, kT + T ], k ∈ N, the same price path ξ1(t) = ξ1(t + T ) = ξ1(t + 2T ) = · · ·
is pursued. The appropriate normal form competition game reads
G =
(
1,R
[0,T ]
+ ,
1
T
∫ T
0
(ξ1(t)− c1)S1(s1(ξ1(t)), ϕ1(ξ1(t)), t)dt
)
,
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assuming that a periodic state, i. e. a state with x1(t) = x1(t + T ) = · · · , has been
reached so that the proposed profit operator indeed yields the average profit per time.
(Instead, profit F∂ could equivalently be used.) Then, if the good is feasible, a con-
stant price is a critical value for the monopoly.
Proof. For simplicity, we abbreviate R := R1
R0
and skip the index 1 for all other
variables. Also, we will introduce the non-dimensional time tˆ = R0t and Tˆ = R0T ,
where for ease of notation, the hats are dropped in the following.
Let ξ(t) be periodic with period T and assume that after some equilibration
time, all other system variables also behave periodically with same period.
The non-dimensionalized ordinary differential equation x˙ = xϕ(Ψ − x) is of
Riccati type and thus readily solved for x,
x =
exp
(∫ t
0
ϕΨdτ
)
∫ t
0
ϕ exp
(∫ τ
0
ϕΨdθ
)
dτ + 1
x(0)
, x(0) =
exp
(∫ T
0
ϕΨdτ
)
− 1∫ T
0
ϕ exp
(∫ τ
0
ϕΨdθ
)
dτ
,
where the expression for x(0) follows from the periodicity condition x(0) = x(T ).
Using S(t)/(NR0) = x˙+Rx = x[R+ϕ(Ψ−x)], the normalized long-term profit
rate can be expressed as
Π
NR0
=
1
T
∫ T
0
(ξ − c)x[R + ϕ(Ψ− x)]dt.
Finally, in appendix B.2.1, a lengthy sequence of non-trivial transformations
proves that the Gaˆteaux derivative of Π with respect to ξ is zero for all test directions
ϑ, if for ξ we substitute the constant price ξ∗ which is implicity defined by ξ∗ − c =
− Ψ(ξ∗)
Ψ′(ξ∗)
, where Ψ′ ≡ dΨ
dξ
. In other words, the Euler-Lagrange equation for Π is
fulfilled for the constant price ξ∗, and hence ξ∗ is critical.
For the constant price to be a Nash equilibrium, the second variation of the
long-term profit rate Π with respect to the price is required to be negative definite.
To show this, we need the following lemma, whose proof is given in appendix B.2.2.
Lemma 3.2.3. Let H : R → {0, 1} be the Heaviside function. The following in-
equality holds for all α ∈ R and Lebesgue-integrable functions ϑ : [0, T ]→ R:∫ T
0
∫ T
0
ϑ(t)ϑ(τ) exp[α(τ − t+ TH(t− τ))]dτdt ≤ exp(αT )− 1
α
∫ T
0
ϑ2dt.
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Under fairly mild conditions on the functions ϕ and Ψ at the critical point ξ∗
we now obtain the optimality result. We will use the same abbreviations as in the
previous proof.
Proposition 3.2.4. Let the conditions of proposition 3.2.2 hold. Moreover, assume
R(ϕΨ)′ ≥ ΨΨ′ϕ2 at the constant critical price ξ∗. Then, for a feasible good, if
2(Ψ′(ξ∗))2 > Ψ′′(ξ∗)Ψ(ξ∗), a constant price is a (local) optimum for the monopoly.
Proof. Only the negative definiteness of the second variation of Π with respect to ξ
remains to be shown. Indeed, using
∫ T
0
〈
∂2x(t)
∂ξ2
, ϑ, ϑ
〉
dt = − 2Ψ
′ϕ′Ψ
exp(ϕΨT )− 1
∫ T
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨt)dt
∫ T
0
ϑ
exp(ϕΨt)
dt
+
(ϕΨ)′′ − ϕ′′Ψ
ϕ
∫ T
0
ϑ2dt− 2Ψ′ϕ′Ψ
∫ T
0
ϑ
exp(ϕΨt)
∫ t
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨτ)dτdt
for any test direction ϑ, appendix B.2.3 derives〈
∂2Π/R0
∂ξ2
, ϑ, ϑ
〉
=
N
T
2Ψ
[
R(ϕΨ)′ −ΨΨ′ϕ2
exp(ϕΨT )− 1
(∫ T
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)
∫ Θ
0
ϑ
exp(ϕΨt)
dtdΘ
+ exp(ϕΨT )
∫ T
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)
∫ T
Θ
ϑ
exp(ϕΨt)
dtdΘ
)
+
(
ϕΨ′ − Rϕ
′
ϕ
− R Ψ
′′
2Ψ′
)∫ T
0
ϑ2dt
]
.
By lemma 3.2.3 we obtain〈
∂2Π/R0
∂ξ2
, ϑ, ϑ
〉
≤ N
T
2Ψ
[
R(ϕΨ)′−ΨΨ′ϕ2
ϕΨ
∫ T
0
ϑ2dt+
(
ϕΨ′−Rϕ
′
ϕ
−R Ψ
′′
2Ψ′
)∫ T
0
ϑ2dt
]
=
N
T
2R
(
Ψ′ − Ψ
′′Ψ
2Ψ′
)∫ T
0
ϑ2dt
for R(ϕΨ)′ ≥ Ψϕ2Ψ′. Hence, under the assumption 2(Ψ′)2 > Ψ′′Ψ (and Ψ′ < 0 and
Ψ ≥ 0 for a feasible product) we have the desired negative definiteness.
The first condition holds for R small enough, i. e. at least for long-lasting prod-
ucts, the latter condition holds for instance for affine Ψ. Hence it indeed makes sense
for some cases to reduce the complex price space R
[0,T ]
+ by focussing on time-constant
prices.
For the issues dealt with so far, the general mathematical system was analytically
treatable. For other questions, we have to resort to specific examples in order
to obtain a qualitative insight into the characteristics of a market with habitual
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Figure 3.1: Optimal affine price evolution (left) as well as subpopulation (solid
line) and sales (dotted line) evolution (right) for parameter values R1 = 0.1R0,
T = 10/R0, r = 0, c1 = 0.1/Ξ1, and x1(0) = 0.001 (cf. example 3.2.2).
imitative consumers. Clearly, in such cases it is instructive to consider only very
simple forms of s, ϕ, and especially ξ that just capture the necessary features for
the discussed problem at hand. In particular, affine functions (the simplest case
possible) are well-suited to study trends (e. g. price trends). The following example
is meant to examine the optimal price trend for a good that is sold during a finite
time period. It illustrates that proposition 3.2.4 does not hold for bounded time
intervals.
Example 3.2.2 (Cumulated discounted profit in a monopoly setting). For simplic-
ity, let us assume ϕ1 = s1 = 1− ξ1Ξ1 , and let us only allow for affine price functions
ξ1(·) ∈ L([0, T ]) := {f : [0, T ] → R | ∃ a, b : f(t) = a + bt}. Consider the normal
form competition game
G =
(
1,L([0, T ]),
∫ T
0
exp[−rt](ξ1(t)− c1)S1 (s1(ξ1(t)), ϕ1(ξ1(t)), t) dt
)
.
For given parameters R1, T, r, c1, x1(0), the optimal price path ξ1(t) can be found nu-
merically (an analytical solution turns out to be too complex to provide any insight).
As a result, for a whole range of realistic parameters we obtain that the product is
initially sold below marginal cost, and then the price rises. One example calculation
is depicted in figure 3.1.
Of course, when r is chosen extremely large, this trend is reversed. However,
this only happens for values of r ∼ R0 to 2R0. This would correspond to an interest
rate of above 100% within the time R−10 , i. e. if on average a consumer thinks of the
good only once a year, the interest rate would have to be above 100% per annum!
From this example, we may conclude that on a market with habitual imitative
consumers a beneficial pricing strategy consists in starting at a low price and then
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increasing the price steadily. It might even be advantageous to initially give away
products for free. The underlying idea is to initially strongly increase the market
share in order to exploit habitual behavior.
3.2.2 Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation as an alternative
solution concept
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman approach is an alternative approach to solve the op-
timization problem incorporated in a differential game. The idea behind this solu-
tion technique for optimal control problems is based on embedding and recursion
(Dockner et al. 2001). That is, the problem of solving a certain optimal control
problem P for a given initial state x0 and initial time t = 0 is interpreted as a spe-
cial case in a class of subproblems {P (x, t)|x ∈ X, t ∈ [0, T ]} with X the state space
and [0, T ] the considered time interval, which are solved in a backward induction
manner, finding the optimum step by step and backwards in time.
To solve a monopoly normal form competition game (1,S,Π) =
(1,RR+, FT (π(·))) subject to the mean dynamic
x˙1 = ϕ1(ξ1)R0x1 (Ψ1(ξ1)− x1) =: F(x1, ξ1),
define V (xˆ1, t)“=”maxξ1
∫ T
t
C(x1(τ), ξ1(τ))dτ to be the prospective optimal profit
starting at time t from an initial state xˆ1, where
C(x1, ξ1) = exp(−rτ)
T
(ξ1 − c1)S1(s1(ξ1), ϕ1(ξ1), x1)
=
exp(−rτ)
T
(ξ1 − c1)N [ϕ1R0x1(Ψ1 − x1) + x1R1]
represents the integrand of the payoff Π. Then the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equa-
tion is given by
∂V (x1, t)
∂t
+max
ξ1
{
∂V (x1, t)
∂x1
F(x1, ξ1) + C(x1, ξ1)
}
= 0.
Compared to the variational approach from the previous section, we have replaced
the combination of an ordinary differential equation and a maximization problem
by a partial differential equation in V (x1, t). While in proposition 3.2.2, we could
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first solve the ordinary differential equation and subsequently the maximization for
arbitrary s1(ξ1) and ϕ1(ξ1), the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation does not allow
for an analytical solution, which is associated with its larger complexity due to the
attempt to solve for all different initial conditions x1(t = 0) at the same time.
However, one can pursue a numerical simulation for special cases. For instance,
choose r = 0, ϕ1 = 1 − ξ1Ξ1 , s1 = 1 −
ξ1
Ξ1
, R0 = 2, R1 = 1, c1 = 0, and thus
Ψ1 = 1− R1R0 1−s1ϕ1 = 1− 12
ξ1
1−ξ1
, where Ξ1 = 1 is the maximum reservation price and
hence the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman differential equation takes the form
∂V
∂t
= −max
ξ1
f(ξ1)
for f(ξ1) :=
(
∂V
∂x1
+Nξ1
)
2(1 − ξ1)x1
(
1− ξ1
2−2ξ1
− x1
)
+ Nξ1x1. By the first order
condition we obtain the optimal price
ξ∗1 =
1
2
(
1− 1
N
∂V
∂x1
)
and hence
max
ξ1
f(ξ1) = f(ξ
∗
1) =
x1
N
(
3
4
− x
2
)(
N +
∂V
∂x1
)2
− x1 ∂V
∂x1
.
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation therefore turns into
∂V
∂t
= −x1
N
(
3
4
− x
2
)(
N +
∂V
∂x1
)2
+ x1
∂V
∂x1
.
The simulation result for the time period [0, 2] is displayed in figure 3.2. Obviously,
the optimal price ξ1 and the prospective profit V increase with x1 since for a high
market share habit and imitation can fully be exploited. Note that for low market
shares x1 the optimal price is initially zero in order to quickly achieve a state with
higher x1.
3.2.3 Oligopoly and polygopoly
In this section we turn to oligopoly and polygopoly markets. As for the monopoly, we
will begin with an introductory example and then prove a feasibility result analogous
to the result for a single firm. Afterwards, we examine the firms’ behavior for an
increasing number of competitors.
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Figure 3.2: Solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (left: ξ1(x1, t), right:
V (x1, t)) for the example in the text.
Example 3.2.3 (Steady state oligopoly prices). Consider the situation of exam-
ple 3.2.1, this time with n firms. Moreover, we now assume ϕi(ξi) =
1
1+
ξi
Ξi
(this
choice renders the system analytically solvable and is an approximation to an affine
ϕi(ξi) for low prices). The corresponding normal form competition game reads
G =
(
n,Rn+, lim
t→∞
(
(ξi − ci)Si(~s, ~ϕ(~ξ), t)
)
i=1,...,n
)
.
If all n products are feasible, the steady state Nash equilibrium oligopoly prices ξ∗i
can be computed analytically (cf. appendix B.2.4),
~ξ∗ =


Ξ1
1−Φ1
0 0
0
. . . 0
0 0 Ξn
1−Φn



Λ+


Λ11 0 0
0
. . . 0
0 0 Λnn




−1Λ


Φ1
...
Φn

+


(1− Φ1)Λ11 c1Ξ1
...
(1− Φn)Λnn cnΞn



 , (3.1)
where Λ is the inverse of matrix An, defined as
(An)ij :=
{
1, j = i,
Φj , j 6= i,
i, j = 1, . . . , n.
This example is one of the very few cases, where the optimal prices can indeed
be calculated analytically. It is not of great importance, but serves to illustrate few
general features of oligopoly markets. First of all, we observe that the reservation
prices Ξi and the marginal costs ci have a positive effect on ξ
∗
i . The reservation
price Ξi even acts as a kind of proportionality factor on ξ
∗
i via the first diagonal
matrix in equation (3.1). Also, due to 1 − Φi = RiR0 (1 − si), the matrix entries
63
and hence the prices tend to infinity as the habit factor si approaches one, the value
where consumers blindly purchase habitually. A further intuitive fact consists in the
shrinking significance of the marginal costs with rising reservation price. Finally, let
us note that the different good parameters Φi, ci, Ξi affect all prices ξ
∗
j , j = 1, . . . , n,
and not just the price of that good which they describe.
Let us now turn to the feasibility of goods in an oligopoly.
Proposition 3.2.5. Consider an n-product market with habitual imitative con-
sumers on which the products i, i = 1, . . . , n − 1, coexist with 0 < Φi < 1. Then
product n is feasible if and only if
Ψn[ξn = cn] > ~˜x · Φ(~˜ξ) =
n−1∑
i=1
Φi(ξ˜i)x˜i
where ~˜x is the vector of market shares on the (n − 1)-goods market (i. e. without
product n) in the steady state and ~˜ξ the corresponding price vector.
Proof. Due to condition 3.2.1, Ψn is monotonously decreasing with ξn. Also, in the
previous chapter we have shown an nth product to be feasible on a market with
habitual imitative consumers, if and only if Ψn > ~˜x · ~Φ. Let us assume, ξˆ is such
that Ψn[ξˆ] = ~˜x · ~Φ(~˜ξ). Then, according to the result just cited, for ξn = ξˆ the
good would just die out on the market so that the n-goods market behaves like the
(n− 1)-goods market and firms 1 to n− 1 choose the prices ~˜ξ. If ξˆ is smaller than
cn, then due to condition 3.2.1, Ψn[ξˆ] is larger than Ψn[ξn] for ξn ≥ cn so that for a
profitable price good n still does not persist on the market. If on the other hand ξˆ
is larger than cn, then by decreasing ξn a little (to which the other firms react by
choosing prices slightly different from ~˜ξ) we obtain a situation in which good n has
a non-zero market share and is sold above marginal costs.
According to the previous chapter, Ψn[ξn = cn] represents the hypothetic
monopoly market share when the price equals the marginal costs. Hence, intu-
itively, the above proposition implies that this hypothetic monopoly market share
has to be larger than the weighted sum of market shares of products 1 to n − 1,
where the weights Φi ≤ 1 are the larger the stronger the corresponding goods induce
habit.
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Next, we shall study market implications from rising numbers of competitors.
To start with, let us return to example 3.2.3 with identical firms.
Proposition 3.2.6. In example 3.2.3, assume a symmetric oligopoly with n identical
firms, where each firm optimally chooses the same price ξ∗,n. Then, for an increasing
number of firms the price ξ∗,n decreases. In the limit n → ∞, it converges to the
marginal cost c.
Proof. Due to the symmetry of the market, we can skip the indices in equation (3.1).
Also, we readily verify Λij =
−Φ
(1−Φ)(1+(n−1)Φ)
for i 6= j and Λii = 1+(n−2)Φ(1−Φ)(1+(n−1)Φ) so
that equation (3.1) yields
ξ∗,n =
ΞΦ+ (n− 1)c− (n− 2)c(1− Φ)
(n− 1)− (n− 3)(1− Φ)
n→∞−→ c.
Furthermore,
ξ∗,n+1
ξ∗,n
=
n +
(
Ξ
c
+ 1−Φ
Φ
)
n− 1 + (Ξ
c
+ 1−Φ
Φ
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:C1>0
· n+
2−3Φ
Φ
n + 1 + 2−3Φ
Φ︸︷︷︸
=:C2≥−1
=
(n+ C1)(n+ C2)
(n + C1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥1
(n + C2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+C1 − C2 − 1 .
Also, since for feasible goods, ξ∗,n ≥ c and Ψ[ξ∗,n] > 0, we have
0 < Ξ
[
Ψ[ξ∗,n]
(
1 +
Ξ
c
)
+
ξ∗,n
c
− 1
]
=
Ξ
c
[Ξ + ξ∗,n + (Ψ[ξ∗,n]− 1)Ξ] + (Ψ[ξ∗,n]− 1)Ξ
⇔ 0 < Ξ
c
+
(Ψ[ξ∗,n]− 1)Ξ
Ξ + ξ∗,n + (Ψ[ξ∗,n]− 1)Ξ = C1 − C2 − 1,
where in the last step we have used 1− Φ = (1−Ψ[ξ∗,n]) Ξ
Ξ+ξ∗,n
. Together with the
above equation, this yields ξ
∗,n+1
ξ∗,n
< 1.
Apparently, competition gets harder the more competitors coexist on the market.
In the limit, we obtain perfect competition. This result actually holds for more
general symmetric markets, which we will prove step by step. We will first show
that steady state Nash equilibrium prices decrease for rising numbers n of firms.
Later we will analyze the limit n→∞.
Lemma 3.2.7. Consider a symmetric oligopoly with n identical firms and with ha-
bitual imitative consumers. Let Φ(ξ) and Ψ(ξ) be differentiable. Then, the derivative
of the steady state profit rate Πni (of the ith firm in the n-goods market) with respect
65
to the price ξi (of the ith product), evaluated at the steady state Nash equilibrium
price ξ∗,n−1 of the (n− 1)-goods market, is negative,
∂Πni
∂ξi
∣∣∣∣
ξi=ξj=ξ∗,n−1
< 0.
Proof. If all n products coexist on the market, the steady state of mean dy-
namic (2.18) can be written as An~x = ~Ψ and the steady state profit of firm i
as
Πni = NRi(ξi − ci)xi = NRi(ξi − ci)Λi~Ψ,
with matrices An and Λ defined as in example 3.2.3 and Λi being the ith row of Λ.
Since Ψj does not depend on ξi for i 6= j, we obtain
∂Πni /(NRi)
∂ξi
=
n∑
j=1
ΛijΨj + (ξi − ci)ΛiidΨi
dξi
+ (ξi − ci)
n∑
j=1
Ψj
∂Λij
∂ξi
.
Due to the market symmetry, we may write Ψi = Ψ, ξi = ξ, and ci = c. The
derivative
∂Λij
∂ξi
at ξi = ξj = ξ can be rewritten as
∂Λ˜ij
∂ξi
, where Λ˜ is the inverse of
matrix
(A˜n)kl =


1, l = k,
Φ, l 6= k, i,
Φi[ξi], l = i, l 6= k.
We readily verify Λ˜ij =
−Φ
1+(n−2)Φ−(n−1)ΦΦi[ξi]
for i 6= j and Λ˜ii = 1+(n−2)Φ1+(n−2)Φ−(n−1)ΦΦi[ξi]
so that
∂
∂ξi
(
n∑
j=1
Λij
) ∣∣∣∣∣
Φi=Φ
=
∂
∂Φi
(
Φ− 1
(n− 1)ΦiΦ− (n− 2)Φ− 1
)∣∣∣∣
Φi=Φ
dΦi
dξi
,
and
∂Πni /(NRi)
∂ξi
=
Ψ
1+(n−1)Φ
[
1+
ξ−c
1−Φ
(
1+(n−2)Φ
Ψ
dΨ
dξ
+
(n−1)Φ
1+(n−1)Φ
dΦ
dξ
)]
.
We would like to show that this is negative at ξi = ξj = ξ
∗,n−1, which is the Nash
equilibrium price on the (n−1)-firms market and hence satisfies ∂Πn−1i
∂ξi
∣∣
ξi=ξj=ξ∗,n−1
=
0. Solving
∂Πn−1i /(NRi)
∂ξi
∣∣
ξi=ξj=ξ∗,n−1
= 0 for (ξ∗,n−1 − c), we obtain
ξ∗,n−1 − c = − Ψ(1− Φ)[1 + (n− 2)Φ]
[1 + (n− 3)Φ][1 + (n− 2)Φ]dΨ
dξ
∣∣
ξ∗,n−1
+ (n− 2)ΦΨdΦ
dξ
∣∣
ξ∗,n−1
.
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This can be inserted into
∂Πni /(NRi)
∂ξi
∣∣
ξi=ξj=ξ∗,n−1
, which yields
∂Πni /(NRi)
∂ξi
∣∣∣∣∣
ξi=ξj=ξ∗,n−1
=
Ψ
1 + (n− 1)Φ
[
1−
[1 + (n− 2)Φ]2 dΨ
dξ
∣∣
ξ∗,n−1
+ (n− 1)ΦΨ1+(n−2)Φ
1+(n−1)Φ
dΦ
dξ
∣∣
ξ∗,n−1
[1 + (n− 3)Φ][1 + (n− 2)Φ]dΨ
dξ
∣∣
ξ∗,n−1
+ (n− 2)ΦΨdΦ
dξ
∣∣
ξ∗,n−1
]
.
This is indeed negative, since the fraction in brackets is larger than one: Due to
dΦ
dξ
, dΨ
dξ
< 0 (follows from condition 3.2.1), all summands in the numerator and
denominator are negative. Furthermore, the first summand of the numerator is
smaller (i. e. more negative) than the first summand of the denominator. The same
holds for the second summands, if we use that for feasible products 0 < Ψ ≤ Φ ≤ 1
and hence 1+(n−2)Φ
1+(n−1)Φ
> n−1
n
.
The previous lemma now implies the desired result.
Proposition 3.2.8. Consider a symmetric oligopoly with n identical firms and with
habitual imitative consumers. Let Φ(ξ) and Ψ(ξ) be differentiable. If Φ(ξ) and
Ψ(ξ) are such that there exists exactly one steady state Nash equilibrium, then the
equilibrium price ξ∗,n decreases as the number of firms n rises.
Proof. We show ξ∗,n ≤ ξ∗,n−1. We may assume
∂Πni
∂ξi
∣∣∣∣
ξi=ξj=c
≥ 0,
since otherwise all firms would choose ξi = c as the unique Nash equilibrium price,
and ξ∗,n−1 must have been greater than or equal to marginal cost c so that the
proposition would already be proven. Also, due to lemma 3.2.7,
∂Πni
∂ξi
∣∣∣∣
ξi=ξj=ξ∗,n−1
< 0.
Define f : R → R, ξ 7→ f(ξ) = ∂Πni
∂ξi
∣∣∣
ξi=ξj=ξ
. Then f is continuous with f(ξ∗,n−1) <
0 and f(c) ≥ 0 so that by Rolle’s theorem there exists a price ξ∗,n ∈ [c, ξ∗,n−1) with
f(ξ∗,n) = 0 at which f changes sign to negative. Hence, ξ∗,n < ξ∗,n−1 is a local
maximizer of Πni and thus the unique Nash equilibrium price.
Hence, despite the consumers’ bounded rationality, our model has intuitively
competitive features. Also, it provides a foundation for perfect competitive equilib-
rium prices as the number of firms tends to infinity: We will next show that the
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prices of the weakest products on the market converge against their marginal costs as
the number of competitors rises to infinity. This holds for a general polygopoly and
directly implies that on the symmetric market all prices converge against marginal
costs.
Lemma 3.2.9. Consider a polygopoly with n firms and with habitual imitative con-
sumers, where all n products coexist in the steady state Nash equilibrium. For given
n, let in denote the index of the “weakest” good, i. e. the one with lowest market
share xin = minj=1,...,n{xj} in the steady state Nash equilibrium. Let Φin(ξin) and
Ψin(ξin) be differentiable. If there is ν > 0 such that in the steady state Nash equi-
librium ∂xin
∂ξin
< −ε < 0 for all n > ν, then as the number of firms n tends to infinity,
the price of good in converges to marginal cost, i. e. (ξ
∗,n
in − cin)→ 0.
Proof. The steady state profit rate of good in is given by Π
n
in = NRin(ξin − cin)xin
so that
∂Πnin
∂ξin
∣∣∣∣
ξj=ξ
∗,n
j
= NRin
(
xin
∣∣
ξj=ξ
∗,n
j
+ (ξin − cin)
∂xin
∂ξin
∣∣∣∣
ξj=ξ
∗,n
j
)
,
where ξj = ξ
∗,n
j indicates evaluation at the steady state Nash equilibrium prices.
For a contradiction, assume there exists δ > 0 such that for all µ > ν there is
n(µ) > µ with (ξ∗,nin − cin) > δ. Hence,
∂Π
n(µ)
in(µ)
∂ξin(µ)
∣∣∣∣
ξj=ξ
∗,n(µ)
j
< NRin(µ)
(
xin(µ) − εδ
)
≤ NRin(µ)
(
1
n(µ)
− εδ
)
which is strictly negative for µ large enough. However, this contradicts the Nash
equilibrium condition
∂Π
n(µ)
in(µ)
∂ξin(µ)
∣∣∣∣
ξj=ξ
∗,n(µ)
j
= 0 so that we obtain lim supn→∞(ξ
∗,n
in −cin) ≤
0.
Since trivially, (ξ∗,nin − cin) ≥ 0, we finally find limn→∞(ξ∗,nin − cin) = 0.
This lemma is almost what we aimed at, however, it depends on conditions on
state variables (
∂xin
∂ξin
< −ε) which might not be satisfied. A shrinking market share
for rising prices is indeed economically plausible but not necessarily true. Hence, we
would like to express all conditions in terms of the control variables Φi and Ψi, for
which we need the following lemma, whose proof is given in appendixB.2.5.
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Lemma 3.2.10. Let 0 < Φi < 1, i = 1, . . . , n, and let Λ be the inverse of matrix
An defined as
(An)ij =
{
1, i = j,
Φj , i 6= j,
i, j = 1 . . . n.
Then,
Λii ≥ 1 and Λij ≤ 0 for all i, j = 1, . . . , n with i 6= j.
Now we can prove an estimate for the change of market shares.
Lemma 3.2.11. Consider a polygopoly with n firms and with habitual imitative
consumers, where all n products coexist in the steady state Nash equilibrium. Let
Φi(ξi) and Ψi(ξi) be differentiable. Then
∂xi
∂ξi
∣∣∣∣
ξj=ξ
∗,n
j
≤ ∂Ψi
∂ξi
∣∣∣∣
ξj=ξ
∗,n
j
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, where xi is understood as the steady state market share.
Proof. Without loss of generality let i = 1. Also, in the following, let all parameters,
equations, and derivatives be evaluated at the steady state Nash equilibrium (i. e. at
ξj = ξ
∗,n
j ). Then, mean dynamic (2.18) yields An~x =
~Ψ, which can be differentiated
with respect to ξ1 to give
∂An
∂ξ1
~x+ An
∂~x
∂ξ1
=
∂~Ψ
∂ξ1
⇔ ∂~x
∂ξ1
= A−1n
(
∂~Ψ
∂ξ1
− ∂An
∂ξ1
~x
)
= A−1n


∂Ψ1
∂ξ1
−x1 ∂Φ1∂ξ1...
−x1 ∂Φ1∂ξ1

 .
Denoting the inverse of An by Λ, the first row of the above equation becomes
∂x1
∂ξ1
= Λ11
∂Ψ1
∂ξ1
− x1∂Φ1
∂ξ1
n∑
j=2
Λ1j ,
which together with the previous lemma and ∂Ψ1
∂ξ1
, ∂Φ1
∂ξ1
≤ 0 (due to condition 3.2.1)
yields the desired result.
The previous lemma can be interpreted as follows: The change of steady state
market shares xi is larger than the change of the corresponding “product qualities”
Ψi, i. e. shares are quite sensitive to quality changes. Lemmata 3.2.9 and 3.2.11 can
now be combined to yield the following.
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Proposition 3.2.12. Consider a polygopoly with n firms and habitual imitative
consumers, where all n products coexist in the steady state Nash equilibrium. For
given n, let in denote the index of the “weakest” good, i. e. the one with lowest market
share xin= minj=1,...,n{xj}. Let Φin(ξin) and Ψin(ξin) be differentiable. If there is
ν> 0 such that ∂Ψin
∂ξin
∣∣
ξin=ξ
∗,n
in
<−ε<0 for all n>ν, then as the number of firms tends
to infinity, the price of good in converges to marginal cost, i. e. (ξ
∗,n
in −cin)→0. 
The proof of this result can inductively be repeated for the second “weakest”
good, the third “weakest” one, and so on up to the mth “weakest” good, where m
is any positive integer.
Corollary 3.2.13. Consider a polygopoly with n firms and let the assumptions from
proposition 3.2.12 hold. As the number of firms tends to infinity, the m “weakest”
products’ prices converge to their marginal costs, where m is any positive integer.
As a consequence, since on a symmetric market any good is the “weakest” one,
the prices of all goods converge to marginal costs. In general, however, there may
be products so superior to the rest of the market that their prices stay away from
marginal costs while all other prices converge against marginal costs. The proof of
lemma 3.2.9 can be slightly adapted to show that this may only be true for a finite
number of products.
3.3 Extensions: welfare, product life cycle gener-
ation, and advertising
To point into possible directions of further research we will briefly discuss three
extensions to our model as there are welfare, the generation of product life cycles,
and advertising.
3.3.1 A welfare definition
In the following, we shall propose a suitable welfare definition for our setting to allow
for theories of social implications. The producer surplus can be calculated as usual
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Figure 3.3: An arbitrary imitation function, plotted as normalized inverse demand
function. The consumer surplus equals CSi =
κi
ϕ∗i
Si, and the producer surplus is
given by PSi =
ιi
ϕ∗i
Si, where ξ
∗
i denotes the current price of product i and ϕ
∗
i = ϕi(ξ
∗
i )
is the resulting imitation coefficient.
from the Marshallian definition, whereas the consumer surplus has to be obtained
differently as a consequence of the non-standard consumer behavior.
Definition 3.3.1 (Welfare). Given the imitation function ϕi(ξi) for good i, the
contribution of that good to the producer and consumer surplus at time t are defined
as
PSi(t) = (ξi(t)− ci)Si(t), (3.2)
CSi(t) =
Si(t)
ϕi(ξi(t))
(∫ ϕi(ξi(t))
0
[
ϕ−1i (ϕ)− ξi(t)
]
dϕ
)
. (3.3)
The social welfare takes the form
W (t) =
n∑
i=1
PSi(t) + CSi(t). (3.4)
For a single good with an arbitrary imitation function, consumer and producer
surplus at a specific time are illustrated in figure 3.3. Before motivating this choice,
note that the imitation function ϕi(ξi) can be interpreted as the demand distribution
for good i. In other words, for a consumer the probability P to have a reservation
price ξrpi for good i larger than or equal to some price ξ
∗
i is given by the demand
distribution, i. e.
ϕi(ξ
∗
i ) = P[ξ
rp
i ≥ ξ∗i ].
Phrased differently, the imitation function ϕi(ξi) constitutes the probability distri-
bution of the reservation price ξrpi of a set of heterogeneous consumers, and the
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reservation price ξrpi is distributed according to the density −dϕi(ξi)dξi . (If instead
we assume fickle homogeneous consumers, where each individual’s reservation price
changes from time to time, ϕi(ξi) can be interpreted as the reservation price prob-
ability of a single consumer.) Against this background, the following alternative
characterization of the consumer surplus may serve as motivation.
Proposition 3.3.1. Let ϕi(ξi)ξi → 0 for ξi → ∞, and let ξ∗i be the current price
of product i and ϕ∗i = ϕi(ξ
∗
i ) the resulting imitation coefficient. Let the consumers’
reservation price ξrpi for good i have probability density −dϕi(ξi)dξi
∣∣
ξrpi
=: −ϕ′i(ξrpi ).
(i) Pick one consumer arbitrarily and give her the option to buy either product i
or none. The expected value of her utility, Ui = max(ξ
rp
i − ξ∗i , 0), is then given
by
E[Ui] =
∫ ∞
ξ∗i
ϕi(ξi)dξi.
(For simplicity, we here also allow infinite values of the expected utility.)
(ii) Pick one consumer, who has reservation price ξrpi ≥ ξ∗i , i. e. who would buy
product i. The expected value of her utility, ui, is given as
E[ui] =
E[Ui]
ϕ∗i
.
(iii) Assume that those consumers who actually buy product i are uniformly dis-
tributed among all potential buyers (i. e. those with ξrpi ≥ ξ∗i ), then the expected
consumer surplus (3.3) is given by
CSi = E[ui]Si =
E[Ui]
ϕ∗i
Si.
Proof. (i) The consumer’s utility Ui is a random variable depending on the reser-
vation price ξrpi . Hence,
E[Ui] =
∫ 1
0
Ui(ξ
rp
i )dP(ξ
rp
i ) =
∫ ∞
0
Ui(ξ
rp
i )(−ϕ′i(ξrpi ))dξrpi
= −
∫ ∞
ξ∗i
(ξrpi −ξ∗i )ϕ′i(ξrpi )dξrpi = − [(ξrpi − ξ∗i )ϕi(ξrpi )]∞ξrpi =ξ∗i+
∫ ∞
ξ∗i
ϕi(ξ
rp
i )dξ
rp
i .
The left summand of the last expression equals zero, since ξrpi ϕi(ξ
rp
i )
ξrpi →∞−→ 0.
(Ui is a so-called integrable random variable, if and only if ϕi ∈ L1([0,∞)), in
which case the integral is bounded.)
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(ii) The consumers with ξrpi ≥ ξ∗i make up ϕi(ξ∗i ) of the total population. Among
them, ξrpi is distributed according to
P[ξrpi ≥ ξ] =
{
1, ξ < ξ∗i ,
ϕi(ξ
rp
i )
ϕi(ξ∗i )
, else,
so that analogously to the above, E[ui] =
E[Ui]
ϕi(ξ∗i )
.
(iii) By a change of variables ϕ = ϕi(ξ
rp
i ) and integration by parts we obtain∫ ϕi(ξ∗i )
0
[ϕ−1i (ϕ)−ξ∗i ]dϕ = −
∫ ∞
ξ∗i
(ξrpi −ξ∗i )ϕ′i(ξrpi )dξrpi =
∫ ∞
ξ∗i
ϕi(ξ
rp
i )dξ
rp
i = E[Ui],
which together with the definition of CSi yields the desired result.
Our definition thus resembles the standard approach: CSi approximates the
average utility of all buyers (given as the difference between average reservation
price among all buyers and the actual price).
As a brief application, we show that for a symmetric oligopoly, the welfare rises
with the number of firms.
Proposition 3.3.2. Consider a symmetric oligopoly with n identical firms and with
habitual imitative consumers. Let ϕ(ξ) and s(ξ) be differentiable and such that
there exists exactly one steady state Nash equilibrium with equilibrium price ξ∗,n. If
the total steady state sales nSn :=
∑n
i=1 Si(ξ
∗,n) increase more strongly in n than
ϕ∗,n := ϕ(ξ∗,n), i. e. d(nS
n)
dn
/(nSn) > dϕ
∗,n
dn
/ϕ∗,n, then the welfare increases for a rising
number of firms.
Proof. As before, since all firms are identical we skip the indices. As illustrated in
figure 3.3, the welfare is given by nS
n
ϕ∗,n
(κ+ ι). Define Ωn = nS
n
ϕ∗,n
, then
dΩn
dn
=
d(nSn)
dn
ϕ∗,n − nSn dϕ∗,n
dn
(ϕ∗,n)2
,
which is larger than 0 by assumption. Also, ξ∗,n decreases for a rising number of
firms by proposition 3.2.8, and hence, κ + ι increases due to the monotonicity of
ϕ(ξ) (condition 3.2.1). Altogether, the welfare rises for rising n.
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Apparently, despite the consumers’ bounded rationality, we obtain the standard
result of an increasing welfare. This implies a certain amount of market efficiency,
comparable to a market with rational consumers.
3.3.2 The generation of product life cycles
In this paragraph, we briefly illustrate how a realistic product life cycle may emerge
from our model. As a simple example, consider a consecutive introduction of many
products, all competing with each other. Think for instance of the mobile phone
market, where new (innovative) mobile phones frequently enter the market. The
maximum reservation price for a product may be assumed highest at its introduction
on the market when it still represents the state of the art, and then it decreases in
time, as innovation goes on. Hence, also habit and imitation function are highest at
the time of product introduction.
The most simple setting is to assume fixed prices ξi, simple imitation and habit
functions ϕi(ξi) = si(ξi) = 1− ξiΞi , new product introductions equally distributed over
time, and a simple evolution of the maximum reservation price Ξi in time, e. g. Ξi =
Ξ
1+αR0(t−ti)
, where ti is the time of introduction of product i. Figure 3.4 shows the
resulting product life cycles of the successively introduced products, obtained from
an exemplary simulation.
Notice the classical pattern with a gentle increase of the sales right after product
launch, a broad maturity period and a quite steep decline until the product vanishes
(cf. for example de Kluyver (1977), Polli & Cook (1969) and others).
3.3.3 Marketing strategies: advertisement
In section 2.2.4, in order to employ specific switching probabilities, we used the
mechanism of imitation (2.6), that is, the probability of buying good i is propor-
tional to the amount xi of people who already own it. xi may here be interpreted as
the probability that the consumer gets to know the product from other consumers.
The multiplicative imitation factor ϕi represents how strongly the consumer is con-
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Figure 3.4: Product life cycles (left) when many products enter the market suc-
cessively and the maximum reservation price Ξi of each product decreases in time
(right). In this simulation we chose ϕi(ξi) = si(ξi) = 1 − ξiΞi with maximum reser-
vation price Ξi =
Ξ
1+αR0(t−ti)
, α = 5 · 10−2. Furthermore, we have a time interval
T = 6
R0
between the introduction of products, an alarm clock rate Ri = 0.025R0
for all goods, an initial subpopulation xi(0) = 10
−3, and constant product prices
ξi = 0.1Ξ.
vinced to buy the good when she knows it. However, consumers can also get to know
the good via advertisements, which constitute an effective tool for firms to influence
the consumers’ buying behavior. The probability to see the product’s commercial is
given by ai ∈ [0, 1], where ai depends positively on the advertising budget. The over-
all probability to become aware of product i (via commercials or other consumers)
hence is ai + xi − aixi so that (2.6) and (2.8) change to
p0i = ϕi(xi + ai − xiai), i 6= 0, (3.5)
pij = (1− si)ϕj(xj + aj − xjaj), i 6= 0 ∧ j 6= 0, i. (3.6)
For the same motivation as in section 2.2.4, equation (2.7) remains unchanged,
pii = si ∈ [0, 1], i 6= 0. (3.7)
We shall in the following always assume ϕi, si > 0. An interesting question would
be whether a non-feasible product can be made feasible by advertising. The follow-
ing proposition provides an answer for a single good market (where we disregard
advertising costs and only examine whether a demand for that good exists).
Proposition 3.3.3. The single product on a market with habitual imitative con-
sumers is always feasible if it is advertised, i. e. a1 > 0.
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Figure 3.5: Stable steady state value of the market share x1 for different advertising
levels a1.
Proof. The mean dynamic for the single good market takes the form
x˙1 = ϕ1R0(x1 + a1 − x1a1) + x1(R1s1 − ϕ1R0(x1 + a1 − x1a1))− R1x1
= x1ϕ1R0[Ψ1 − 2a1 − x1(1− a1)] + ϕ1R0a1.
In the stationary state x˙1 = 0 we thus obtain
x1 =


1
2−Ψ1
, a1 = 1,
Ψ1−2a1+
√
(Ψ1−2a1)2+4a1(1−a1)
2−2a1
, a1 6= 1,
which is positive for a1 > 0, irrespective of the value of Ψ1.
Apparently, commercials help the good to survive on the market. This statement
is illustrated in figure 3.5 where the steady state market share is shown for different
advertising levels. For a positive level, the market share is always positive and hence
the product feasible.
Note that in proposition 3.3.3 we only consider the demand side of the market,
i. e. we examine whether the product is demanded by consumers in the steady state.
We ignore that the firm might not be able to operate in the black because of immense
advertising costs.
An analogous result can be shown for an oligopoly.
Proposition 3.3.4. On an n-product market with habitual imitative consumers,
product i is always feasible if it is advertised, i. e. ai > 0 (unless there is a good j
with Φj = 1).
Proof. The mean dynamic reads
x˙i = ϕiR0xi
[
Ψi − 2ai − (1− ai)
(
xi +
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
Φjxj
)]
+ ϕiR0ai
(
1−
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
Φjxj
)
.
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Figure 3.6: Optimal affine price evolution (left) and optimal affine advertising ex-
penses (middle), as well as subpopulation (solid line) and sales (dotted line) evo-
lution (right) for parameter values R1 = 0.1R0, T = 10/R0, r = 0, c1 = 0.1/Ξ1,
K = 2 · 10−6, x1(0) = 0 (cf. example 3.3.1).
For xi = 0 we obtain x˙i > 0. Hence, the system trajectory can never approach xi = 0
so that the market share of product i always stays strictly away from zero.
An advertising campaign is usually associated with costs that depend on its
reach. Let us therefore introduce advertising costs cai for good i. Obviously, the
derivative ∂ai
∂cai
has to be non-negative. With this altered model at hand, various sim-
ulations can be performed for specific functions ϕi(ξi), si(ξi) and ai(c
a
i ). One could
for instance examine the product feasibility including advertising costs, whether
advertising is profitable at all, how large ai should optimally be, or whether there
is a threshold value for xi above which advertising is no longer beneficial. For il-
lustration, we pick up example 3.2.2 and add advertising. We will compute the
optimal affine pricing and advertising strategy. Before, however, we need to extend
the definition of the normal form competition game.
With advertising, firms have a second strategic variable besides their prod-
uct’s price which represents the advertising expenses. Hence, the set S of
all possible strategy combinations now is a subset of the space of n-tuples
over maps (ξi, c
a
i ) : R+ → R2+, t 7→ (ξi(t), cai (t)), S ⊆
[
(R2+)
R+
]n
=
(R2+)
R+ × . . . × (R2+)R+ . The components of profit Π : S → Rn+ now become
Πi(ξ1, . . . , ξn, c
a
1, . . . , c
a
n) = F
[
(ξi(t)− ci)Si
(
~s(~ξ(t)), ~ϕ(~ξ(t)),~a(~ca(t)), t
)
− ~ca(t)
]
,
where ~S(~s(~ξ(t)), ~ϕ(~ξ(t)),~a(~ca(t)), t) denotes the sales vector produced by the popu-
lation game including advertising according to equations (3.5) and (3.6).
Example 3.3.1 (Cumulated discounted profit in a monopoly setting with advertis-
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ing). For simplicity, let us assume ϕ1 = s1 = 1 − ξ1Ξ1 and a1 = 11+K/ca1 , and let us
only allow for affine price and advertising cost functions ξ1(·), ca1(·) ∈ L([0, T ]) :=
{f : [0, T ]→ R | ∃ a, b : f(t) = a+ bt}. Consider the normal form competition game
G=
(
1,L2([0, T ]),
∫ T
0
exp[−rt] [(ξ1(t)−c1)S1 (s1(ξ1(t)), ϕ1(ξ1(t)), a1(ca1(t)), t)−ca1(t)]dt
)
.
For given parameters R1, T, r, c1, x1(0), the optimal price paths ξ1(t) and c
a
1(t) can be
found numerically. As a result, for a whole range of realistic parameters we obtain
the reverse of example 3.2.2: The price decreases with time. One example calculation
is depicted in figure 3.6.
Apparently, a firm is recommended to start an advertising campaign in parallel to
the product launch and steadily decrease the product price as well as the advertising
expenses during the lifespan of the product. Due to the initial advertising, the
market share is rapidly increased with brute force. Via the subsequent price decrease,
habit purchases can be kept on a high level, and reluctant customers are attracted.
Thereby, the market is optimally exploited by initially letting customers with a
high reservation price pay high prices and only later reducing the price to make
people with low reservation prices buy the product (similarly to the concept of price
discrimination). Advertising becomes less crucial when the market share has already
reached a certain level (the product sells itself) and is therefore reduced.
3.4 Conclusion
We examined the optimal strategic pricing for firms when the demand evolution
is generated by the behavior of boundedly rational consumers who follow a rule
of thumb and base their decisions on imitation and habit. The demand dynamic
is described within the framework of a population game with associated switching
probabilities, and it serves as a basis for strategic pricing of a monopoly or oligopoly
in a differential game. The optimal price paths correspond to Nash equilibria of a
normal form competition game.
The modeling approach is supported by psychological and experimental stud-
ies, and the introduced methodology allows for broad applications and qualitative
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theoretical analysis.
We investigated product feasibility (i. e. the conditions under which firms oper-
ate profitably in the long-term) and expressed it with the help of the hypothetical
popularity of the product if it was sold for a price equal to the marginal cost. Fur-
thermore, we showed that markets with habitual imitative consumers are in a sense
well-behaved: For a rising number of firms, the prices decrease, the prices of the
weakest products (but not necessarily of all products) converge against marginal
costs, and the welfare rises (at least for a symmetric market). Such results (despite
the boundedly rational consumer behavior) prove once more the existence of some
kind of efficiency in not totally rational markets.
We also proved for the monopoly that under certain conditions, Nash equilibria
are found in the strategy space of all time-constant price paths so that a reduction
of the (quite complex and untractable) strategy space of all possible price paths is
at least sometimes sensible.
Finally, the assumed boundedly rational consumer behavior was shown to lead
to observed market patterns such as product life cycles, and extensions to the model
were proposed and examined such as an adequate definition of welfare, which allows
for analysis of social implications, and the introduction of advertising, which allows
to explore optimal advertising strategies.
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Appendices
A.1 Appendix to chapter 2
A.1.1 Proof of lemma 2.3.4
Proof. Consider the matrix function M(t) := I + t(An− I) such that M(0) = I and
M(1) = An, where I denotes the identity matrix. Since det(M) is continuous in M ,
it is also continuous in t. If det(M(1)) were non-positive, then according to Rolle’s
theorem there would exist some t ∈ (0, 1] with det(M(t)) = 0. However, det(M(t))
cannot be zero due to the following reasoning: For a contradiction, assume the
columns of An to be linearly dependent, i. e.
~0 =
n∑
i=1
αi (Φi, . . . , 1,Φi, . . .)
T
for αi 6= 0. This can be rewritten as
~0 =


α1(1− Φ1)
...
αn(1− Φn)

+ n∑
i=1
αi


Φi
...
Φi

 ,
which together with Φi < 1 implies αi =
k
1−Φi
, for some number k. Plugging this
back into the equation we obtain
0 = k
(
1 +
n∑
i=1
Φi
1− Φi
)
,
which is impossible for Φi
1−Φi
> 0.
A.1.2 Proof of proposition 2.3.5
Proof. For the computation, assume that also product n exists in the steady state.
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1. Linear system of equations: Since by assumption xi > 0 in the steady state
for i = 1, . . . , n we obtain a linear system of steady state equations from the
mean dynamic (2.18):
An~x = ~Ψ
2. Cramer’s rule: Due to the previous step, An is invertible. According to
Cramer’s rule the solution to An~x = ~Ψ is given by
xi =
det ((An)i→~Ψ)
det (An)
where matrix (An)i→~Ψ equals An with column i replaced by
~Ψ.
3. Cramer’s rule backwards: Let us denote the vector of ones by ~1 and letM6i, 6j be
matrixM with the ith row and jth column removed. Using Laplace expansion
for the last column,
det ((An)n→~Ψ)
=
n∑
i=1
(−1)i+nΨi det((An) 6i, 6n)
=
n−1∑
i=1
(−1)i+nΦiΨi det(((An) 6i, 6n)i→~1) + Ψn det(An−1)
=
n−1∑
i=1
(−1)ΦiΨi det((An−1)i→~1) + Ψn det(An−1)
= −
n−1∑
i,j=1
(−1)i+jΦiΨi det((An−1) 6j, 6i) + Ψn det(An−1)
= −
n−1∑
i,j=1
i6=j
(−1)i+jΦiΨiΦj det(((An−1)j→~1) 6j, 6i)−
n−1∑
i=1
ΦiΨi det((An−1) 6i, 6i) + Ψn det(An−1)
= −
n−1∑
i,j=1
i6=j
(−1)i+jΦiΨiΦj det(((An−1)i→~1) 6i, 6j)−
n−1∑
i=1
ΦiΨi det((An−1) 6i, 6i) + Ψn det(An−1)
= −
n−1∑
i,j=1
(−1)i+jΦjΨi det((An−1) 6i, 6j) + Ψn det(An−1)
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= −
n−1∑
j=1
Φj det((An−1)j→~Ψ) + Ψn det(An−1)
= det(An−1)
(
Ψn −
n−1∑
i=1
Φi
(
A−1n−1
~Ψ
)
i
)
,
where the last step follows from Cramer’s rule and Laplace expansion has been
applied various times.
Overall, we obtain
product n feasible ⇔ xn > 0
lemma2.3.4⇔ xn det(An) > 0
step2⇔ det((An)n→~Ψ) > 0
step3⇔ det(An−1)
(
Ψn −
n−1∑
i=1
Φi
(
A−1n−1
~Ψ
)
i
)
> 0
lemma2.3.4⇔ Ψn >
n−1∑
i=1
Φi
(
A−1n−1
~Ψ
)
i
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B.2 Appendix to chapter 3
B.2.1 Criticality of a constant monopoly price (proposition 3.2.2)
Using the relation (obtained via integration by parts and Fubini’s theorem)∫ t
0
f(τ)
∫ τ
0
g(θ)dθdτ =
[∫ t
0
f(τ)dτ
∫ t
0
g(τ)dτ
]t
0
−
∫ t
0
∫ τ
0
f(θ)dθg(τ)dτ =
∫ t
0
g(τ)
∫ t
τ
f(θ)dθdτ,
we can write the variation of x(t) with respect to ξ in some test direction ϑ as
fi
∂x(t)
∂ξ
, ϑ
fl
=
exp(ϕΨt)
"R t
0 (ϕΨ)
′ϑdτ
“
exp(ϕΨt)−1
Ψ
+ 1
Ψ
”
−
R t
0 exp(ϕΨτ)
`
ϕ′ϑ+ ϕ
R τ
0 (ϕΨ)
′ϑ(θ)dθ
´
dτ −
RT
0 exp(ϕΨτ)(ϕ
′ϑ+ϕ
R τ
0 (ϕΨ)
′ϑdθ)dτ(exp(ϕΨT )−1)−
RT
0 (ϕΨ)
′ϑdτ exp(ϕΨT )
RT
0 ϕ exp(ϕΨτ)dτ
(exp(ϕΨT )−1)2
#
“
exp(ϕΨt)−1
Ψ
+ 1
Ψ
”2
=
exp(ϕΨt)
"
(ϕΨ)′
R t
0 ϑdτ
exp(ϕΨt)
Ψ
−
R t
0 exp(ϕΨτ)
`
ϕ′ϑ+ ϕ(ϕΨ)′
R τ
0 ϑdθ
´
dτ −
RT
0 exp(ϕΨτ)(ϕ
′ϑ+ϕ(ϕΨ)′
R τ
0 ϑdθ)dτ(exp(ϕΨT )−1)−(ϕΨ)
′
RT
0 ϑdτ exp(ϕΨT )
RT
0 ϕ exp(ϕΨτ)dτ
(exp(ϕΨT )−1)2
#
“
exp(ϕΨt)
Ψ
”2
=
exp(ϕΨt)
"
(ϕΨ)′
exp(ϕΨt)
Ψ
R t
0 ϑdτ − ϕ
′
R t
0 exp(ϕΨτ)ϑdτ − ϕ(ϕΨ)
′
R t
0 exp(ϕΨτ)
R τ
0 ϑdθdτ −
RT
0 exp(ϕΨτ)(ϕ
′ϑ+ϕ(ϕΨ)′
R τ
0 ϑdθ)dτ(exp(ϕΨT )−1)−(ϕΨ)
′
RT
0 ϑdτ exp(ϕΨT )
RT
0 ϕ exp(ϕΨτ)dτ
(exp(ϕΨT )−1)2
#
“
exp(ϕΨt)
Ψ
”2
=
exp(ϕΨt)
"
(ϕΨ)′
exp(ϕΨt)
Ψ
R t
0 ϑdτ − ϕ
′
R t
0 exp(ϕΨτ)ϑdτ − ϕ(ϕΨ)
′
R t
0 exp(ϕΨτ)
R τ
0 ϑdθdτ −
RT
0 exp(ϕΨτ)(ϕ
′ϑ+ϕ(ϕΨ)′
R τ
0 ϑdθ)dτ(exp(ϕΨT )−1)−(ϕΨ)
′
RT
0 ϑdτ exp(ϕΨT )
RT
0 ϕ exp(ϕΨτ)dτ
(exp(ϕΨT )−1)2
#
“
exp(ϕΨt)
Ψ
”2
=
exp(ϕΨt)
"
(ϕΨ)′
exp(ϕΨt)
Ψ
R t
0 ϑdτ − ϕ
′
R t
0 exp(ϕΨτ)ϑdτ − ϕ(ϕΨ)
′
R t
0 ϑ
R t
θ exp(ϕΨτ)dτdθ −
RT
0 exp(ϕΨτ)(ϕ
′ϑ+ϕ(ϕΨ)′
R τ
0 ϑdθ)dτ(exp(ϕΨT )−1)−(ϕΨ)
′
RT
0 ϑdτ exp(ϕΨT )
RT
0 ϕ exp(ϕΨτ)dτ
(exp(ϕΨT )−1)2
#
“
exp(ϕΨt)
Ψ
”2
=
exp(ϕΨt)
"
(ϕΨ)′
exp(ϕΨt)
Ψ
R t
0 ϑdτ − ϕ
′
R t
0 exp(ϕΨθ)ϑdθ − ϕ(ϕΨ)
′
R t
0 ϑ
exp(ϕΨt)−exp(ϕΨθ)
ϕΨ
dθ −
RT
0 exp(ϕΨτ)(ϕ
′ϑ+ϕ(ϕΨ)′
R τ
0 ϑdθ)dτ(exp(ϕΨT )−1)−(ϕΨ)
′
RT
0 ϑdτ exp(ϕΨT )
RT
0 ϕ exp(ϕΨτ)dτ
(exp(ϕΨT )−1)2
#
“
exp(ϕΨt)
Ψ
”2
=
exp(ϕΨt)
"
−ϕ′
R t
0 exp(ϕΨθ)ϑdθ +
(ϕΨ)′
Ψ
R t
0 ϑ exp(ϕΨθ)dθ −
RT
0 exp(ϕΨτ)(ϕ
′ϑ+ϕ(ϕΨ)′
R τ
0 ϑdθ)dτ(exp(ϕΨT )−1)−(ϕΨ)
′
RT
0 ϑdτ exp(ϕΨT )
RT
0 ϕ exp(ϕΨτ)dτ
(exp(ϕΨT )−1)2
#
“
exp(ϕΨt)
Ψ
”2
=
exp(ϕΨt)
"
ϕΨ′
Ψ
R t
0 ϑ exp(ϕΨθ)dθ −
ϕ′
RT
0 exp(ϕΨτ)ϑdτ+ϕ(ϕΨ)
′
RT
0 exp(ϕΨτ)
R τ
0 ϑdθdτ
exp(ϕΨT )−1
+
(ϕΨ)′ exp(ϕΨT )
RT
0 ϕ exp(ϕΨτ)dτ
RT
0 ϑdτ
(exp(ϕΨT )−1)2
#
“
exp(ϕΨt)
Ψ
”2
=
exp(ϕΨt)
"
ϕΨ′
Ψ
R t
0 ϑ exp(ϕΨθ)dθ −
ϕ′
exp(ϕΨT )−1
RT
0 ϑ exp(ϕΨθ)dθ −
ϕ(ϕΨ)′
exp(ϕΨT )−1
RT
0 exp(ϕΨτ)
R τ
0 ϑdθdτ +
(ϕΨ)′ exp(ϕΨT )
RT
0 ϕ exp(ϕΨτ)dτ
(exp(ϕΨT )−1)2
R T
0 ϑdτ
#
“
exp(ϕΨt)
Ψ
”2
=
exp(ϕΨt)
»
ϕΨ′
Ψ
R t
0 ϑ exp(ϕΨθ)dθ −
ϕ′Ψ
Ψ(exp(ϕΨT )−1)
R T
0 ϑ exp(ϕΨθ)dθ +
(ϕΨ)′
Ψ(exp(ϕΨT )−1)
RT
0 ϑ exp(ϕΨθ)dθ
–
“
exp(ϕΨt)
Ψ
”2 =
Ψ
»
ϕΨ′
R t
0 ϑ exp(ϕΨθ)dθ +
ϕΨ′
exp(ϕΨT )−1
R T
0 ϑ exp(ϕΨθ)dθ
–
exp(ϕΨt)
.
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Using the price ξ implicitly defined by ξ − c = −Ψ(ξ)/Ψ′(ξ) (which follows from maximizing the profit for a constant price and a
steady state, i. e. no periodic oscillations), the variation of the profit rate then is given as
〈
∂Π/R0
∂ξ
, ϑ
〉
=
1
R0
d
dε
Π(ξ(·) + εϑ(·))
∣∣∣∣
ε=0
=
N
T
∫ T
0
x(R + ϕ(Ψ − x))ϑ+ (ξ − c)
(
x(ϕΨ)′ϑ− x2ϕ′ϑ+
〈
∂x(t)
∂ξ
, ϑ
〉
(R+ ϕΨ − 2ϕx)
)
dt
=
N
T
∫ T
0
Ψ(R+ ϕ(Ψ −Ψ))ϑ− Ψ
Ψ′

Ψ(ϕΨ)′ϑ−Ψ2ϕ′ϑ+

exp(ϕΨt)
[
ϕΨ′
Ψ
∫ t
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨθ)dθ + ϕΨ
′
Ψ(exp(ϕΨT )−1)
∫ T
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨθ)dθ
]
(
exp(ϕΨt)
Ψ
)2

 (R+ ϕΨ − 2ϕΨ)

dt
=
N
T
(ΨR−Ψ2ϕ)
∫ T
0
ϑdt− N
T
∫ T
0
Ψ
Ψ′
(R− ϕΨ)

exp(ϕΨt)
[
ϕΨ′
Ψ
∫ t
0 ϑ exp(ϕΨθ)dθ +
ϕΨ′
Ψ(exp(ϕΨT )−1)
∫ T
0 ϑ exp(ϕΨθ)dθ
]
(
exp(ϕΨt)
Ψ
)2

 dt
=
N
T
(ΨR−Ψ2ϕ)
∫ T
0
ϑdt− N
T
Ψ3
Ψ′
(R− ϕΨ)
∫ T
0
exp(ϕΨt)
(exp(ϕΨt))
2
ϕΨ′
Ψ
∫ t
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨθ)dθdt − N
T
Ψ3
Ψ′
(R − ϕΨ)
∫ T
0
exp(ϕΨt)
(exp(ϕΨt))
2
ϕΨ′
Ψ(exp(ϕΨT )− 1)
∫ T
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨθ)dθdt
=
N
T
(ΨR−Ψ2ϕ)
∫ T
0
ϑdt− N
T
Ψ2ϕ(R− ϕΨ)
∫ T
0
1
exp(ϕΨt)
∫ t
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨθ)dθdt− N
T
Ψ2ϕ(R− ϕΨ)
∫ T
0
1
exp(ϕΨt)
1
exp(ϕΨT )− 1
∫ T
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨθ)dθdt
=
N
T
(ΨR−Ψ2ϕ)
∫ T
0
ϑdt− N
T
Ψ2ϕ(R− ϕΨ)
∫ T
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨθ)
∫ T
θ
1
exp(ϕΨt)
dtdθ − N
T
Ψ2ϕ(R − ϕΨ)
∫ T
0
1
exp(ϕΨt)
1
exp(ϕΨT )− 1dt
∫ T
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨθ)dθ
=
N
T
(ΨR−Ψ2ϕ)
∫ T
0
ϑdt− N
T
Ψ2ϕ(R− ϕΨ)
∫ T
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨθ)
[
− 1
ϕΨexp(ϕΨT )
+
1
ϕΨexp(ϕΨθ)
]
dθ −
N
T
Ψ2ϕ(R − ϕΨ)
exp(ϕΨT )− 1
[
− 1
ϕΨexp(ϕΨT )
+
1
ϕΨ
] ∫ T
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨθ)dθ
=
N
T
(ΨR−Ψ2ϕ)
∫ T
0
ϑdt− N
T
Ψ(R− ϕΨ)
∫ T
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨθ)
[
− 1
exp(ϕΨT )
+
1
exp(ϕΨθ)
]
dθ −
N
T
Ψ(R− ϕΨ)
exp(ϕΨT )− 1
[
1− 1
exp(ϕΨT )
]∫ T
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨθ)dθ
=
N
T
(ΨR−Ψ2ϕ)
[∫ T
0
ϑdt−
∫ T
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨθ)
[
− 1
exp(ϕΨT )
+
1
exp(ϕΨθ)
]
dθ − 1
exp(ϕΨT )− 1
[
1− 1
exp(ϕΨT )
] ∫ T
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨθ)dθ
]
=
N
T
(ΨR−Ψ2ϕ)
[∫ T
0
ϑdt−
∫ T
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨθ)
[
− 1
exp(ϕΨT )
+
1
exp(ϕΨθ)
]
dθ − 1
exp(ϕΨT )
∫ T
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨθ)dθ
]
=
N
T
(ΨR−Ψ2ϕ)
[∫ T
0
ϑdt−
∫ T
0
ϑdθ
]
= 0.
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B.2.2 Proof of lemma 3.2.3
Proof. For Lebesgue-integrable functions ϑ, θ, let us define the bilinear forms
〈ϑ, θ〉L =
∫ T
0
∫ T
0
ϑ(t)θ(τ) exp[α(τ − t+ TH(t− τ))]dτdt
〈ϑ, θ〉R = exp(αT )− 1
α
∫ T
0
ϑ(t)θ(t)dt.
For ϑ ∈ L1([0, T ])\L2([0, T ]), 〈ϑ, ϑ〉R is unbounded so that 〈ϑ, ϑ〉L ≤ 〈ϑ, ϑ〉R trivially.
Hence, let us assume ϑ ∈ L2([0, T ]) from now on.
〈·, ·〉L and 〈·, ·〉R are (sequentially) continuous in both arguments in L2([0, T ]):
let θk
k→∞−→ θ in L2([0, T ]). By Ho¨lder’s inequality and the continuous Sobolev
embedding L2([0, T ]) →֒ L1([0, T ]),
|〈ϑ, θ〉R−〈ϑ, θk〉R| =
∣∣∣∣
∫ T
0
ϑ(θ − θk)dt
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ||ϑ||L2||θ − θk||L2 k→∞−→ 0
|〈ϑ, θ〉L−〈ϑ, θk〉L| =
∣∣∣∣
∫ T
0
∫ T
0
ϑ(θ − θk)eα(τ−t+TH(t−τ))dτdt
∣∣∣∣ ≤ e|αT |
∫ T
0
|ϑ|dt
∫ T
0
|θ − θk|dt
= e|αT |||ϑ||L1||θ − θk||L1 ≤ C||ϑ||L2||θ − θk||L2 k→∞−→ 0
for some constant C. Continuity in the first argument follows analogously. By
∣∣〈θ, θ〉L/R − 〈θk, θk〉L/R∣∣ ≤ ∣∣〈θ, θ〉L/R − 〈θ, θk〉L/R∣∣ + ∣∣〈θ, θk〉L/R − 〈θk, θk〉L/R∣∣ k→∞−→ 0
we immediately have continuity of ϑ 7→ 〈ϑ, ϑ〉L/R.
We would like to show 〈ϑ, ϑ〉L ≤ 〈ϑ, ϑ〉R for regular step functions ϑ ∈ T ={∑N−1
i=0 aiχ[ iN T,
i+1
N
T ]
∣∣∣N ∈ N, ai ∈ R}. The lemma then follows by the above-shown
continuity and the density of regular step functions in L2([0, T ]): It is well-known
that step functions are dense in L2([0, T ]), so density of T in the space of step
functions remains to be shown. Let f =
∑n−1
j=0 bjχ[tj ,tj+1], 0 = t0 ≤ · · · ≤ tn = T .
Set fk =
∑k−1
j=0 f(
j
k
T )χ[ j
k
T, j+1
k
T ] ∈ T . fk equals f on all intervals [ jkT, j+1k T ] which
lie completely in an interval [ti, ti+1]. This is not the case for a maximum number
of n intervals [ j
k
T, j+1
k
T ]. Hence, ||fk − f ||L2 ≤ nTk (maxi,j |bi − bj |)2
k→∞−→ 0.
92
Now, let ϑ =
∑N−1
i=0 aiχ[ iN T,
i+1
N
T ] and assume α 6= 0. Then,
〈ϑ, ϑ〉R = e
αT − 1
α
N−1∑
j=0
a2j
∫ j+1
N
T
j
N
T
1dt =
eαT − 1
α
N−1∑
j=0
a2j
T
N
,
〈ϑ, ϑ〉L =
N−1∑
i=0
N−1∑
j=0
aiaj
∫ i+1
N
T
i
N
T
∫ j+1
N
T
j
N
T
eα(τ−t+TH(t−τ))dτdt
=
(
1− eα TN )(1− e−α TN )
α2
aAaT +
eαT − 1
α
N−1∑
j=0
a2j
T
N
,
where a = (a0, . . . , aN−1)
T and the matrix A is given by
Aij =


−eα i−jN T , i > j,
−eαN+i−jN T , i < j,
eα
T
N −eαT
1−eα
T
N
, i = j.
Hence, 〈ϑ, ϑ〉L ≤ 〈ϑ, ϑ〉R is equivalent to
(
1−eα TN )(1−e−α TN )aAaT ≤ 0 ⇔ aAaT ≥ 0 ⇔ aBaT := 1
2
a(A+AT)aT ≥ 0.
However, this is true since B is weakly diagonally dominant with non-negative di-
agonal entries,
∑
j 6=i
|Bij| = −1
2
(∑
j 6=i
Aij +
∑
j 6=i
Aji
)
=
1
2
2
N−1∑
j=1
ejα
T
N =
1− eαT
1− eα TN
−1 = e
α T
N − eαT
1− eα TN
= Bii,
and thus by Gershgorin’s theorem, B is positive semi-definite. For α = 0, the
inequality 〈ϑ, ϑ〉L ≤ 〈ϑ, ϑ〉R follows from continuity in α = 0 (using de l’Hoˆpital’s
rule).
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B.2.3 Negative definite second variation of profit for constant price (proposition 3.2.4)
*
∂2Π/R0
∂ξ2
, ϑ, ϑ
+
=
*
∂
D
∂Π/R0
∂ξ
, ϑ
E
∂ξ
, ϑ
+
=
N
T
Z
T
0
fi
∂x(t)
∂ξ
, ϑ
fl
[R + ϕ(Ψ − 2x)]ϑ+ x[(ϕΨ)
′
− xϕ
′
]ϑϑ+
»
x(ϕΨ)
′
ϑ− x
2
ϕ
′
ϑ +
fi
∂x(t)
∂ξ
, ϑ
fl
(R + ϕΨ − 2ϕx)
–
ϑ
+(ξ − c)
"fi
∂x(t)
∂ξ
, ϑ
fl
(ϕΨ)
′
ϑ + x(ϕΨ)
′′
ϑϑ − 2x
fi
∂x(t)
∂ξ
, ϑ
fl
ϕ
′
ϑ− x
2
ϕ
′′
ϑϑ +
*
∂2x(t)
∂ξ2
, ϑ, ϑ
+
(R + ϕΨ − 2ϕx) +
fi
∂x(t)
∂ξ
, ϑ
fl„
(ϕΨ)
′
ϑ− 2ϕ
′
xϑ− 2ϕ
fi
∂x(t)
∂ξ
, ϑ
fl«#
dt
=
N
T
Z T
0
Ψ
»
ϕΨ′
R t
0 ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ +
ϕΨ′
exp(ϕΨT )−1
RT
0 ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ
–
exp(ϕΨt)
[R + ϕ(Ψ − 2x)]ϑ+ x[(ϕΨ)
′
− xϕ
′
]ϑϑ+
2
664x(ϕΨ)′ϑ − x2ϕ′ϑ +
Ψ
»
ϕΨ′
R t
0 ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ +
ϕΨ′
exp(ϕΨT )−1
RT
0 ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ
–
exp(ϕΨt)
(R + ϕΨ − 2ϕx)
3
775 ϑ
−
Ψ
Ψ′
2
664
Ψ
»
ϕΨ′
R t
0 ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ +
ϕΨ′
exp(ϕΨT )−1
R T
0 ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ
–
exp(ϕΨt)
(ϕΨ)
′
ϑ + x(ϕΨ)
′′
ϑϑ − 2x
Ψ
»
ϕΨ′
R t
0 ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ+
ϕΨ′
exp(ϕΨT )−1
RT
0 ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ
–
exp(ϕΨt)
ϕ
′
ϑ− x
2
ϕ
′′
ϑϑ +
*
∂2x(t)
∂ξ2
, ϑ, ϑ
+
(R + ϕΨ − 2ϕx)
+
Ψ
»
ϕΨ′
R t
0 ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ +
ϕΨ′
exp(ϕΨT )−1
RT
0 ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ
–
exp(ϕΨt)
0
BB@(ϕΨ)′ϑ − 2ϕ′xϑ − 2ϕ
Ψ
»
ϕΨ′
R t
0 ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ +
ϕΨ′
exp(ϕΨT )−1
RT
0 ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ
–
exp(ϕΨt)
1
CCA
3
775 dt
=
N
T
Z
T
0
Ψ
»
ϕΨ′
R t
0 ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ +
ϕΨ′
exp(ϕΨT )−1
RT
0 ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ
–
exp(ϕΨt)
(R− ϕΨ)ϑ+ ΨϕΨ
′
ϑϑ +
2
664ΨϕΨ′ϑ+
Ψ
»
ϕΨ′
R t
0 ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ+
ϕΨ′
exp(ϕΨT )−1
RT
0 ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ
–
exp(ϕΨt)
(R− ϕΨ)
3
775ϑ
−
Ψ
Ψ′
2
664
Ψ
»
ϕΨ′
R t
0 ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ +
ϕΨ′
exp(ϕΨT )−1
R T
0 ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ
–
exp(ϕΨt)
(ϕΨ)
′
ϑ +Ψ(ϕΨ)
′′
ϑϑ − 2Ψ
Ψ
»
ϕΨ′
R t
0 ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ +
ϕΨ′
exp(ϕΨT )−1
R T
0 ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ
–
exp(ϕΨt)
ϕ
′
ϑ − Ψ
2
ϕ
′′
ϑϑ +
*
∂2x(t)
∂ξ2
, ϑ, ϑ
+
(R− ϕΨ)
+
Ψ
»
ϕΨ′
R t
0 ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ +
ϕΨ′
exp(ϕΨT )−1
RT
0 ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ
–
exp(ϕΨt)
0
BB@ϕΨ′ϑ − ϕ′Ψϑ− 2ϕ
Ψ
»
ϕΨ′
R t
0 ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ +
ϕΨ′
exp(ϕΨT )−1
R T
0 ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ
–
exp(ϕΨt)
1
CCA
3
775dt
=
N
T
Z
T
0
Ψ
»
ϕΨ′
R t
0 ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ +
ϕΨ′
exp(ϕΨT )−1
RT
0 ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ
–
exp(ϕΨt)
(R− ϕΨ)ϑ+ 2ΨϕΨ
′
ϑϑ
+
Ψ
»
ϕΨ′
R t
0 ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ +
ϕΨ′
exp(ϕΨT )−1
RT
0 ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ
–
exp(ϕΨt)
2
664Rϑ − 2Ψϕϑ + Ψ
2
Ψ′
ϕ
′
ϑ+ 2ϕ
Ψ2
Ψ′
»
ϕΨ′
R t
0 ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ +
ϕΨ′
exp(ϕΨT )−1
RT
0 ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ
–
exp(ϕΨt)
3
775
−
Ψ2
Ψ′
»
ϕΨ′
R t
0 ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ +
ϕΨ′
exp(ϕΨT )−1
R T
0 ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ
–
exp(ϕΨt)
(ϕΨ
′
ϑ− Ψϕ
′
ϑ) − 2Ψ
2
ϕ
′
ϑϑ −
Ψ2
Ψ′
ϕΨ
′′
ϑϑ −
Ψ
Ψ′
*
∂2x(t)
∂ξ2
, ϑ, ϑ
+
(R− ϕΨ)dt
=
N
T
Z
T
0
2Ψ
»
ϕΨ′
R t
0 ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ +
ϕΨ′
exp(ϕΨT )−1
R T
0 ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ
–
exp(ϕΨt)
 
Rϑ − 2ϕΨϑ +
Ψ2
Ψ′
ϕ
′
ϑ+
ϕ2Ψ2
exp(ϕΨt)
"Z
t
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ +
1
exp(ϕΨT ) − 1
Z
T
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ
#!
−2Ψ
2
ϕ
′
ϑ
2
−
Ψ2
Ψ′
ϕΨ
′′
ϑ
2
+ 2ΨϕΨ
′
ϑ
2
−
Ψ
Ψ′
(R− ϕΨ)
*
∂2x(t)
∂ξ2
, ϑ, ϑ
+
dt
=
N
T
Z T
0
2Ψ
»
ϕΨ′
R t
0 ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ +
ϕΨ′
exp(ϕΨT )−1
R T
0 ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ
–
exp(ϕΨt)
 
Rϑ − 2ϕΨϑ +
Ψ2
Ψ′
ϕ
′
ϑ+
ϕ2Ψ2
exp(ϕΨt)
"Z t
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ +
1
exp(ϕΨT ) − 1
Z T
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ
#!
dt
+
N
T
 
−2Ψ
2
ϕ
′
−
Ψ2
Ψ′
ϕΨ
′′
+ 2ΨϕΨ
′
!Z T
0
ϑ
2
dt−
N
T
Ψ
Ψ′
(R− ϕΨ)
Z T
0
*
∂2x(t)
∂ξ2
, ϑ, ϑ
+
dt
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=
N
T
2ΨϕΨ
′
Z
T
0
1
exp(ϕΨt)
Z
t
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ
" 
R− 2ϕΨ +
Ψ2
Ψ′
ϕ
′
!
ϑ +
ϕ2Ψ2
exp(ϕΨt)
 Z
t
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ +
1
exp(ϕΨT ) − 1
Z
T
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ
!#
dt
+
N
T
2ΨϕΨ′
exp(ϕΨT )− 1
Z T
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ
"Z T
0
1
exp(ϕΨt)
 
R − 2ϕΨ +
Ψ2
Ψ′
ϕ
′
!
ϑdt +
Z T
0
1
exp(ϕΨt)
ϕ2Ψ2
exp(ϕΨt)
 Z t
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ +
1
exp(ϕΨT ) − 1
Z T
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ
!
dt
#
+
N
T
 
−2Ψ
2
ϕ
′
−
Ψ2
Ψ′
ϕΨ
′′
+ 2ΨϕΨ
′
!Z T
0
ϑ
2
dt−
N
T
Ψ
Ψ′
(R− ϕΨ)
Z T
0
*
∂2x(t)
∂ξ2
, ϑ, ϑ
+
dt
=
N
T
2ΨϕΨ
′
" 
R− 2ϕΨ +
Ψ2
Ψ′
ϕ
′
!Z
T
0
ϑ
exp(ϕΨt)
Z
t
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘdt+ ϕ
2
Ψ
2
Z
T
0
1
exp(ϕΨt)2
„Z
t
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ
«2
dt +
ϕ2Ψ2
exp(ϕΨT ) − 1
„Z
T
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ
«Z
T
0
1
exp(ϕΨt)2
Z
t
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘdt
#
+
N
T
2ΨϕΨ′
exp(ϕΨT )− 1
Z T
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ
" 
R− 2ϕΨ +
Ψ2
Ψ′
ϕ
′
!Z T
0
ϑ
exp(ϕΨt)
dt + ϕ
2
Ψ
2
Z T
0
1
exp(ϕΨt)2
Z t
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘdt+
ϕ2Ψ2
exp(ϕΨT ) − 1
Z T
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ
Z T
0
1
exp(ϕΨt)2
dt
#
+
N
T
 
−2Ψ
2
ϕ
′
−
Ψ2
Ψ′
ϕΨ
′′
+ 2ΨϕΨ
′
!Z
T
0
ϑ
2
dt−
N
T
Ψ
Ψ′
(R− ϕΨ)
Z
T
0
*
∂2x(t)
∂ξ2
, ϑ, ϑ
+
dt
=
N
T
2ΨϕΨ
′
" 
R− 2ϕΨ +
Ψ2
Ψ′
ϕ
′
!Z
T
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)
Z
T
Θ
ϑ
exp(ϕΨt)
dtdΘ +
ϕΨ
2
Z
T
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨ̟)
Z
T
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ) exp(−2ϕΨmax{Θ,̟})dΘd̟−
ϕΨ
2 exp(ϕΨT )2
„Z
T
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨ̟)d̟
«2
+
ϕΨ
2(exp(ϕΨT ) − 1)
„Z T
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ
«Z T
0
ϑ
exp(ϕΨΘ)
dΘ−
ϕΨexp(−2ϕΨT )
2(exp(ϕΨT )− 1)
„Z T
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ
«2#
+
N
T
2ΨϕΨ′
exp(ϕΨT ) − 1
Z T
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ
" 
R −
3
2
ϕΨ +
Ψ2
Ψ′
ϕ
′
!Z T
0
ϑ
exp(ϕΨt)
dt
−
ϕΨ
2 exp(ϕΨT )2
Z
T
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ +
ϕΨ
2(exp(ϕΨT ) − 1)
Z
T
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ(1 − exp(−2ϕΨT ))
#
+
N
T
 
−2Ψ
2
ϕ
′
−
Ψ2
Ψ′
ϕΨ
′′
+ 2ΨϕΨ
′
!Z
T
0
ϑ
2
dt−
N
T
Ψ
Ψ′
(R − ϕΨ)
Z
T
0
*
∂2x(t)
∂ξ2
, ϑ, ϑ
+
dt
=
N
T
2ΨϕΨ
′
 
R − 2ϕΨ +
Ψ2
Ψ′
ϕ
′
!Z T
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)
Z T
Θ
ϑ
exp(ϕΨt)
dtdΘ +
N
T
(Ψ
′
ϕ
2
Ψ
2
)
Z T
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨ̟)
Z T
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)
exp(ϕΨmax{Θ,̟})2
dΘd̟ −
N
T
Ψ′ϕ2Ψ2
exp(ϕΨT )2
„Z T
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨ̟)d̟
«2
+
N
T
Ψ′ϕ2Ψ2
(exp(ϕΨT ) − 1)
„Z
T
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ
«Z
T
0
ϑ
exp(ϕΨΘ)
dΘ−
N
T
Ψ′ϕ2Ψ2
exp(ϕΨT )2(exp(ϕΨT )− 1)
„Z
T
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ
«2
+
N
T
2ΨϕΨ′
exp(ϕΨT ) − 1
 
R −
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ϕ
′
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T
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ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ
Z
T
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ϑ
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+
N
T
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exp(ϕΨT )2 − exp(ϕΨT )
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T
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+
N
T
 
−2Ψ
2
ϕ
′
−
Ψ2
Ψ′
ϕΨ
′′
+ 2ΨϕΨ
′
!Z
T
0
ϑ
2
dt−
N
T
Ψ
Ψ′
(R− ϕΨ)
Z
T
0
*
∂2x(t)
∂ξ2
, ϑ, ϑ
+
dt
=
N
T
2ΨϕΨ
′
 
R − 2ϕΨ +
Ψ2
Ψ′
ϕ
′
!Z T
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)
Z T
Θ
ϑ
exp(ϕΨt)
dtdΘ +
N
T
(Ψ
′
ϕ
2
Ψ
2
)
Z T
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ϑ exp(ϕΨ̟)
Z T
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ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)
exp(ϕΨmax{Θ,̟})2
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N
T
2Ψϕ
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exp(ϕΨT )− 1
„Z
T
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ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ
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T
0
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exp(ϕΨΘ)
dΘ
!
+
N
T
 
−2Ψ
2
ϕ
′
−
Ψ2
Ψ′
ϕΨ
′′
+ 2ΨϕΨ
′
!Z
T
0
ϑ
2
dt−
N
T
Ψ
Ψ′
(R− ϕΨ)
Z
T
0
*
∂2x(t)
∂ξ2
, ϑ, ϑ
+
dt
=
N
T
2ΨϕΨ
′
 
R − 2ϕΨ +
Ψ2
Ψ′
ϕ
′
!Z T
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)
Z T
Θ
ϑ
exp(ϕΨt)
dtdΘ +
N
T
(Ψ
′
ϕ
2
Ψ
2
)
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ϑ exp(ϕΨ̟)
 Z T
̟
ϑ
exp(ϕΨΘ)
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ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)
exp(2ϕΨ̟)
dΘ
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d̟
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N
T
2Ψϕ
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exp(ϕΨT )− 1
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0
ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ
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0
ϑ
exp(ϕΨΘ)
dΘ
!
+
N
T
 
−2Ψ
2
ϕ
′
−
Ψ2
Ψ′
ϕΨ
′′
+ 2ΨϕΨ
′
!Z T
0
ϑ
2
dt−
N
T
Ψ
Ψ′
(R− ϕΨ)
Z T
0
*
∂2x(t)
∂ξ2
, ϑ, ϑ
+
dt
=
N
T
2ΨϕΨ
′
 
R − 2ϕΨ +
Ψ2
Ψ′
ϕ
′
!Z
T
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)
Z
T
Θ
ϑ
exp(ϕΨt)
dtdΘ +
N
T
(Ψ
′
ϕ
2
Ψ
2
)
Z
T
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨ̟)
Z
T
̟
ϑ
exp(ϕΨΘ)
dΘd̟ +
N
T
(Ψ
′
ϕ
2
Ψ
2
)
Z
T
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exp(ϕΨ̟)
Z
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ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘd̟
+
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T
2Ψϕ
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0
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dΘ
!
+
N
T
 
−2Ψ
2
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ϕΨ
′′
+ 2ΨϕΨ
′
!Z T
0
ϑ
2
dt−
N
T
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Ψ′
(R− ϕΨ)
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0
*
∂2x(t)
∂ξ2
, ϑ, ϑ
+
dt
=
N
T
2ΨϕΨ
′
 
R − 2ϕΨ +
Ψ2
Ψ′
ϕ
′
!Z
T
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)
Z
T
Θ
ϑ
exp(ϕΨt)
dtdΘ +
N
T
(Ψ
′
ϕ
2
Ψ
2
)
Z
T
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨ̟)
Z
T
̟
ϑ
exp(ϕΨΘ)
dΘd̟ +
N
T
(Ψ
′
ϕ
2
Ψ
2
)
Z
T
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)
Z
T
Θ
ϑ
exp(ϕΨ̟)
d̟dΘ
+
N
T
2Ψϕ
Ψ′R− ΨϕΨ′ +Ψ2ϕ′
exp(ϕΨT )− 1
„Z
T
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ
« Z
T
0
ϑ
exp(ϕΨΘ)
dΘ
!
+
N
T
 
−2Ψ
2
ϕ
′
−
Ψ2
Ψ′
ϕΨ
′′
+ 2ΨϕΨ
′
!Z
T
0
ϑ
2
dt−
N
T
Ψ
Ψ′
(R− ϕΨ)
Z
T
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*
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∂ξ2
, ϑ, ϑ
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N
T
2ΨϕΨ
′
 
R − ϕΨ +
Ψ2
Ψ′
ϕ
′
!Z T
0
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Z T
Θ
ϑ
exp(ϕΨt)
dtdΘ +
N
T
2ΨϕΨ
′
 
R− Ψϕ+
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Ψ′
ϕ
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!
1
exp(ϕΨT )− 1
„Z T
0
ϑ exp(ϕΨΘ)dΘ
« Z T
0
ϑ
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!
+
N
T
2ΨϕΨ
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−
Ψϕ′
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−
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B.2.4 Oligopoly price for example 3.2.3
Proof. Let An and Λ = (A
−1
n ) be as in example 3.2.3. Furthermore, let us write
vectors (ai)i=1,...,n as ~a and diagonal n× n matrices with diagonal entries (ai)i=1,...,n
as a¯. If all n goods coexist on the market, then for the steady state the mean
dynamic (2.18) can be rewritten as
~Ψ = An~x.
According to equation (2.5), the sales ~S and the profit ~Π then adopt the form
~S = NR¯~x = NR¯A−1n
~Ψ and ~Π = (ξ¯ − c¯)~S = (ξ¯ − c¯)NR¯A−1n ~Ψ.
Letting (A−1n )i denote the ith row of matrix A
−1
n , the Nash equilibrium is found by
solving the system of first order optimality conditions
0 =
dΠi
dξi
= NRi
(
A−1n
)
i
[
~Ψ+ (ξi − ci)d
~Ψ
dξi
]
, i = 1, . . . , n,
where d
~Ψ
dξi
=
(
0, . . . , 0, 1−Ψi
ϕi
, 0, . . . , 0
)T dϕi
dξi
. For the system to be analytically solvable,
we chose ϕi =
(
1+ ξi
ξ¯i
)−1
and hence dϕi
dξi
= −ϕ2i
ξ¯i
. Then, for i = 1, . . . , n the optimality
condition can be equivalently transformed into
Λi


1− 1−Φ1
ξ¯1
(ξ¯1 + ξ1)
...
1− 1−Φi
ξ¯i
(ξ¯i − ci + 2ξi)
1− 1−Φi+1
ξ¯i+1
(ξ¯i+1 + ξi+1)
...


= 0,
or expressed as a sum,
n∑
j=1
Λij
(
Φj − 1− Φj
ξ¯j
ξj
)
− Λii
(
1− Φi
ξ¯i
ξi − (1− Φi)ci
ξ¯i
)
= 0, i = 1, . . . , n.
In matrix notation this reads
Λ +


Λ11 0 0
0
. . . 0
0 0 Λnn






1−Φ1
ξ¯1
0 0
0
. . . 0
0 0 1−Φn
ξ¯n

 ~ξ = Λ~Φ+


(1− Φ1)Λ11 c1ξ¯1
...
(1− Φn)Λnn cnξ¯n

 ,
which directly implies the solution for the optimal prices ~ξ∗.
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B.2.5 Proof of lemma 3.2.10
Proof. In chapter 2 we have shown
det


1 α2 · · · αm
α1 1
...
...
...
. . . αm
α1 α2 . . . 1

 > 0 (8)
for any m > 0 and 0 < αi < 1, i = 1, . . . , m, which we will need later.
According to Cramer’s rule
Λij =
det(An)i→ej
det(An)
,
where (An)i→ej denotes matrix An with the ith column replaced by the jth unit
vector ej . For i 6= j, using Laplace expansion along the ith column and subsequent
column and row interchanges of the (i, j)-minor matrix of An, we obtain
det(An)i→ej = − detB0,
where (without loss of generality assuming i < j)
B0 =


Φj Φ1 · · · Φi−1 Φi+1 · · · Φj−1 Φj+1 · · · Φn
Φj 1
...
...
...
...
...
... Φ1
. . . Φi−1
...
...
...
...
...
... 1 Φi+1
...
...
...
...
... Φi−1 1
...
...
...
...
...
... Φi+1
. . . Φj−1
...
...
...
...
...
... 1 Φj+1
...
...
...
...
... Φj−1 1
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
. . . Φn
Φj Φ1 · · · Φi−1 Φi+1 · · · Φj−1 Φj+1 · · · 1


.
In order to show detB0 ≤ 0, let us define Bt for 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 by replacing the (1, 1)-
entry in B0 by Φj + t(1 − Φj). Now, t 7→ detBt is continuous with detB1 > 0 due
to (8). Hence, if we had detB0 < 0, then by Rolle’s theorem there would be some
t ∈ (0, 1) with detBt = 0. However,
detBt = (Φj + t(1− Φj)) det


1 Φ1 · · · Φn
Φj
Φj+t(1−Φj)
1
...
...
...
. . . Φn
Φj
Φj+t(1−Φj)
Φ1 · · · 1

 ,
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which due to (8) is larger than zero, since 0 <
Φj
Φj+t(1−Φj)
< 1. This contradicts
detBt = 0 so that our initial assumption detB0 < 0 is wrong. Also, we have
detAn > 0 due to (8) so that finally, Λij =
−detB0
detAn
≤ 0. Moreover, from 1 =∑n
j=1Λij(An)ji = Λii +
∑
j 6=iΛij(An)ji ≤ Λii we obtain Λii ≥ 1.
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